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ABSTRACT
Mass incarceration or overincarceration has gained significant attention over the last two
decades, and criminal justice reform seeks to address it. This study uses constructivist
grounded theory to examine the implementation of criminal justice reform legislation in
Mississippi. Mississippi was chosen as the study setting because the state has been
recognized as a national leader in enacting reform legislation and it has one of the
nation’s highest incarceration rates. It is well established that policy implementation
affects outcomes. Therefore, if the policies Mississippi is implementing are effective and
they are implemented correctly, it stands to reason the state could benefit substantially
from successful implementation. In other words, implementation should very much
matter in Mississippi. The purpose of this dissertation was to build a set of theories that
identify and explain obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform. The
researcher applied Charmaz’s (2014) constructivist grounded theory to do so, and the
result was seven theories that best explained the primary obstacles to the implementation
of reform legislation in Mississippi. These seven theories were: 1) failure to convince, (2)
failure to hit targets, (3) failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language, (4) failure to
make data accessible, (5) failure to reinvest, (6) failure to make programs affordable, and
(7) failure to address pre-trial problems. Failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language
was identified as the one theory that best explained, overall, blockades to implementation
in Mississippi. These theories should be transferrable to other jurisdictions.
Keywords: Criminal justice reform; grounded theory; constructivist grounded
theory; mass incarceration; overincarceration; over-incarceration; implementation
analysis; implementation evaluation.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
There is an oft-repeated phrase that the United States has five percent of the
world’s population but 25 percent of its prisoners (Loury, 2008; Ye Hee Lee, 2015). The
raw size of its incarcerated population exceeds every other nation in the world except
perhaps China, whose estimated incarcerated population ranges from approximately
400,000 persons below the United States to approximately 200,000 persons above it
(World Prison Brief, 2018; see also Cullen & Jonson, 2017; Gottschalk, 2015; Pfaff,
2017). Its incarceration rate, which is the rate at which persons are incarcerated per
population, far exceeds other liberal democracies (Pfaff, 2018; Wagner & Sawyer, 2018;
Wagner & Walsh, 2016). For example, as shown in Figure 1, its 2016 incarceration rate
of 698 persons per 100,000 in jails or prisons was substantially higher than the United
Kingdom, which was the NATO nation with the closest rate at 139 such persons per
100,000 (Wagner & Sawyer, 2018). The difference between the United States and United
Kingdom was a difference of 559 persons per 100,000, and when extrapolated across
10,000,000 persons in a sample population, it was a difference of 55,000 persons. These
differences become larger when comparing the United States to the other NATO nations
such as neighboring Canada with a rate of 114, France with 102, and Iceland with the
lowest at 38. The U.S. rate arguably surpasses advanced autocracies and totalitarian
states, but transparency issues with those nations make their data less reliable and that
conclusion less certain.
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Figure 1. U.S. incarceration rate versus NATO countries.
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Note. The rates were obtained from Wagner and Sawyer (2018), who calculated the rates based on data
from the World Prison Brief from the Institute for Criminal Policy Research.

The Sentencing Project has estimated that even assuming a 1.8% decline in the
U.S. prison population per year, it would take until 2101 for the population to return to
1980 levels when there were 315,964 prisoners and our rate and population were more
comparable to other nations (Gottschalk, 2015). The amount of work that will be required
to reduce the incarceration rate and prison population raises an initial question: is this a
problem worth addressing? (Alexander, 2010; Garland, 2001; Gottschalk, 2015; Pfaff,
2017; Weiss & MacKenzie, 2010). Yes, for economic reasons and, when
overincarceration occurs, moral ones. Corrections costs have ballooned over the last
several decades, claiming an ever-increasing number of tax revenues (Cullen & Jonson,
2017; Gottschalk, 2015). For example, from 1979/1980 – 2012/2013, state and local
corrections expenditures increased by 324%, from $17 to $71 billion (Brown & DouglasGabriel, 2016; Stullich, Morgan, & Schak, 2016). Some observers such as Pfaff (2017)
2

are dismissive of this financial concern on the grounds these amounts constitute a small
percentage of state budgets, but this line of thinking is how “[a] billion here, a billion
there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money” becomes a reality (U.S. Senate
Historical Office, 2020). These are real dollars that could be dedicated to other
worthwhile public investments or savings to taxpayers. In addition to economic
considerations, moral ones are implicated as well (Alexander, 2010; Gottschalk, 2015).
These are essentially arguments that the fabric of communities and families are torn apart
when persons are incarcerated and that we are currently overincarcerating. Imprisonment
generally leaves damage in its wake to parties who did no wrong, such as spouses and
children who are left behind. This can have drastic effects on those who now no longer
have a father, mother, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, etc. to be present in their lives.
Therefore, if society is overincarcerating beyond the amount necessary to serve public
safety and the functions of the criminal justice system, incarceration becomes a problem.
This is a potential cost to these persons and society that should be considered.
Criminal justice reform largely assumes mass incarceration is a problem and
seeks to address it (Garduque, 2018; Mauer, 2011; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016; Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2018a; Schoenfeld, 2012). Over approximately the past two decades,
criminal justice reform legislation and policies have been enacted at the local, state, and
federal levels (Cadora, 2014, Mauer, 2011). All of these efforts have sought in some way
to reduce incarceration levels, and more legislation continues to be proposed, debated,
and enacted today. These efforts address a mix of front-end reforms, such as sentencing
reduction, and back-end reforms, such as recidivism reduction, parole changes, and
reentry assistance (Mauer, 2011).
3

Efforts to reform criminal justice began at about the same time as evidence-based
practices were being adopted numerous fields, including criminal justice. (Garduque,
2018; Mauer, 2011; National Institute of Corrections, 2009; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016;
Schoenfeld, 2012). Evidence-based practices expressly involve the application of
scientific principles to public policy (Miller & Miller, 2015). Typically, a policy or
program is “evidence-based” only after rigorous examination and successful replication,
meaning that the program has been successfully implemented in at least one location
other than the site of the original study (Baron, 2018; Cullen & Jonson, 2017; Miller &
Miller, 2015). As a result of criminal justice reform and evidence-based practices rising
in popularity at about the same time, many state-level criminal justice reform packages
are based at least in part on evidence-based practices (Mauer, 2011, Pew Charitable
Trusts, 2017a).
Criminal justice reform must be implemented in a “criminal justice system” or
apparatus that is vast and complex. Reform generally must be implemented across and
within the numerous government entities, including state-level departments of
corrections, local law enforcement agencies, state prisons, local jails, courts, juvenile
courts and detention facilities, and private contractors (Smith et al., 2012; Mears, 2010).
Problems arise. Legislators cannot foresee every contingency that will be faced by those
charged with implementing legislation. Additionally, those charged with implementing
legislation do not always share the same values as those enacting it (Lipsky, 1980;
Persson & Goldkuh, 2010; Rothstein, 2003).
Traditional bureaucracies are thought to exhibit hierarchical lines of authority and
rigid rule application (Boyne, 2002; Pandey & Wright, 2006; Wright & Pandey, 2010;
4

Wright, 2004). Although many public agencies today maintain many of these
characteristics, they are often not as bureaucratic as is commonly believed and civil
servants and street-level bureaucrats may exercise discretion and serve as a filter between
legislation and its implementation (Smith et al., 2012). Even in agencies where upperlevel management adopts criminal justice reform as a priority agenda item, there may be
limits to the ability of the leadership to change the attitudes and beliefs of those who
disagree with reform but are charged with its implementation (Lipsky, 2010; MaynardMoody and Musheno, 2003). This, in turn, can negatively affect implementation.
It is well-established that policy implementation affects outcomes (Durlak &
Dupree, 2008; Duwe & Clark, 2015; Gresham et al., 1993). Because of this, it can
reasonably be stated that criminal justice reform cannot reach its full level of
effectiveness if it is not implemented correctly (Lipsey, 1999; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003,
Miller & Miller, 2015; Zajac, 2015; Wilson & Lipsey, 2000). Implementation of statelevel criminal justice reform is particularly important because approximately 87% of
incarcerated persons are held in state systems (Pfaff, 2017). This means that state-level
reforms have the most potential to impact the size of the overall prison population
(Cadora, 2014; Campbell et al., 2015; Hagan, 2010; Pfaff, 2017; Prison Policy Initiative,
2019).
Problem Statement
Implementation problems are common with criminal justice legislation (Mears,
2010; Smith et al., 2012). Identifying the source of these problems is difficult because
implementation often occurs in a “black box” (see also Duwe & Clark, 2015, Latessa,
2018; Zajac, 2015). That is, there is an information vacuum because we cannot see the
5

process as it unfolds. Activities occur within the box, but they cannot be seen by the
outside observer. This leads to a situation where even though the existence of some type
of implementation problem can often be inferred through identification of a failed policy,
identifying the precise source of a problem can be challenging if not impossible.
While outcome evaluations are common and scholarship about “what works” in
criminal justice is fairly well-developed, implementation evaluations have been
conducted with far less frequency (Petersilia, 2008; Lin, 2012). This has resulted in
implementation scholarship that is unclear, and there does not yet appear to be a broad
consensus about the factors that lead to successful implementation or serve as an obstacle
to it (Latessa, 2018; Mears, 2010).
The criminal justice implementation evaluations that do exist provide frameworks
for research such as this (Duwe & Clark, 2015; Ellickson and Petersilia, 1983;
Greenwood & Welsh, 2012; Smith et al., 2012). These studies generally seek to identify
factors that lead to successful implementation, as opposed to identifying obstacles, but
the obstacles that have been identified include a lack of financial resources, lack of
stakeholder buy-in, staff resistance to change, policy complexity, political and
community resistance, and inadequate time or infrastructure (Bishop, 2012; Greenwood
& Welsh, 2012; Lipsey & Howell, 2012; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003; Smith et al., 2012).
These studies have generally used the case study method, and important to the present
research, a study has not been found that used the grounded theory approach to construct
a theory or theories about obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform. This
dissertation does just that: it uses the grounded theory approach to qualitative research to
develop a set of theories about obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform.
6

Study Setting
Mississippi was an ideal location in which to undertake this study. Mississippi has
one of the highest incarceration rates in the nation that has one of the highest
incarceration rates in the world (Prison Policy Initiative, 2019). At the same time, the
state has been recognized as a leader in criminal justice reform and the development of
evidence-based practices (Leins, 2019; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2017a). In 2012,
Mississippi joined the Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative. This initiative seeks to
incorporate evidence-based practices into state-level policymaking in all fifty states (Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2017b). In 2014, the State Legislature passed the first criminal justice
reform measures with House Bills 585 and 906. When discussing criminal justice reform
in Mississippi, House Bill 585 is the foundational bill. In short, House Bill 585 reduced
mandatory time for many offenses and expanded judicial discretion to use alternative
sentencing schemes, such as drug courts (Gelb & Pheiffer, 2018; Wright, 2014). House
Bill 906 dismantled the “regimented inmate discipline” (RID) program, which was a
paramilitary-style training program modeled after similar programs popular around the
country in the 1980s through the early 2000s, and called for an evidence-based program
to take its place (Blakinger, 2019; Dreher, 2016). Legislative reform efforts continued
after 2014 with the passage of House Bill 387 in 2018, House Bill 1352 and Senate Bill
2781 in 2018, and Senate Bill 2795 in 2021. Collectively, these measures following
House Bill 585 are directed towards incarceration for the inability to pay court fees or
bail (relevant to an issue known as “debtors’ prisons”); the increased use of alternative
sentencing and specialist courts such as drug courts, mental health courts, and veterans
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courts; changes to probation and parole; and occupational licensing issues, among others
(Gates, 2018; Gelb & Pheiffer, 2018; Robertson, 2019).
The size of Mississippi’s prison population has declined since it began adopting
these reform measures, providing a correlation (but not necessarily causation) between
reform measures and declining populations. Data published by the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC) reflects that in January of 2014, the year in which
the first criminal justice reform measures were enacted, the inmate custody population
numbered 22,008. By January of 2020, the number was 18,971, a reduction of over 3,000
inmates (Mississippi Department of Corrections, 2020).
Prison populations are expensive and detract from other public investments or
savings to taxpayers. In the case of Mississippi, total appropriations to MDOC have
increased over time. From 2011 to 2020, allocations to MDOC increased from
$328,771,055 to $338,384,557. The increase from 2011 to 2015 was particularly
pronounced, when allocations reached a high of $367,051,342. There has been a general
decline in allocations from 2015 until 2020, the same time span during which the first
criminal justice reform measures were enacted and prison populations began to decline,
but it is unknown whether these decreases were tied to actual savings resulting from
reform or simply reflected forced legislative budget cuts.
In addition to the financial cost, there is also the non-economic, human side of the
equation to consider. Seven percent of Mississippi children – 55,000 kids – have had a
parent in prison (Frazier, 2020). Research indicates the incarceration of a parent is
damaging to a young person’s education, health, and social well-being, and can be more
traumatic than death or divorce (Sparks, 2015). Reducing the number of innocently
8

affected children impacts their futures and how they develop as citizens. For these
reasons, both the economic and the non-economic, reform in this state can make a
substantial difference, and it makes the state an attractive location to examine whether
criminal justice reform has been implemented as advertised.
Purpose Statement
If implemented correctly, criminal justice reform measures have the potential to
save tax dollars and positively impact lives and communities. Part of ensuring that reform
measures are implemented correctly is determining whether obstacles exist, and if so,
identifying what they are and how and why they exist. Only then can the obstacles be
addressed. The purpose of this study was to build a grounded theory or theories that
identify and explain obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform (Creswell,
2018; Charmaz, 2014, Kilbourn, 2006). These theories have the potential to educate
decision-makers on the obstacles that need to be removed for full implementation to
occur. To achieve the objective of this study, the researcher attempted to get inside the
metaphorical black box of policy implementation by interviewing key players in state and
local government who have had active roles in implementing Mississippi’s criminal
justice reform measures and others who are knowledgeable about the process.
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
An implementation evaluation is a very specific type of policy analysis that is
situated within a larger policy evaluation framework. Mears (2010) and Welsh and Harris
(2016) offer two such frameworks that are for the specific purpose of evaluating criminal
justice policy. Mears (2010) proposed a framework that he termed the “evaluation
research framework,” and it consists of five hierarchical steps: (1) a needs assessment; (2)
a theory evaluation; (3) an implementation evaluation, also called a process evaluation;
(4) an outcome evaluation, also called an impact evaluation; and (5) a cost-efficiency
evaluation, which consists of both cost-effective and cost-benefit evaluations. Welsh and
Harris (2016) offered a framework similar to that offered by Mears, but suggested seven
steps instead of five. The difference between the two is one more of form (i.e., how to
articulate the number of steps) than of substance (i.e., how policy is examined).
Each of the steps in Mears’ hierarchy or similar frameworks such as Welsh and
Harris (2016) is important, yet distinct. To date, the focus in criminal justice literature has
been on outcome analysis. An outcome analysis examines whether and how well a policy
achieves its intended objective, and it is often referred to colloquially in the literature as
“what works” (Fagan & Mihalic, 2003; Lin, 2012; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003; Miller &
Miller, 2015; Smith et al., 2012).
This focus on outcome analysis has produced considerable scholarship concerning
“what works,” but much less attention has been paid to implementation analysis, which is
the evaluative step that precedes an outcomes analysis. An implementation analysis is
concerned with whether a policy is implemented as intended as opposed to whether it
produced intended outcomes (Mears, 2010). It is sometimes referred to colloquially as
10

“how it works” (Fagan & Mihalic, 2003; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003; Miller & Miller, 2015;
Smith et al., 2012) or making “‘what works’ work” (Andrews, 2006, p. 595). The most
important objective of an implementation analysis is to ascertain program fidelity, also
referred to as program integrity (Mears, 2010; Miller & Miller, 2015). Fidelity is a
measurement of whether a treatment is delivered consistent with the intent and design of
a policy or program (Durlak and DuPre, 2008; Mears, 2010, Miller & Miller, 2015). The
growth of evidence-based policies and funding for them has placed a premium on the
ability of researchers and practitioners to measure program fidelity because financing
tends to flow to programs that are proven to work as advertised (Miller & Miller, 2015).
More attention to implementation, “how it works” or making “‘what works’
work,” is needed for a number of reasons. One, implementation affects outcomes (Durlak
& Dupree, 2008; Duwe & Clark, 2015; Gresham et al., 1993; Lipsey, 1999; Mihalic &
Irwin, 2003; Miller & Miller, 2015; Zajac, 2015; Wilson & Lipsey, 2000). This is why
some scholars suggest implementation evaluations must precede outcome evaluations in
order to make reliable causal inferences (Duwe & Clark, 2015; Latessa, 2018; Miller &
Miller, 2015). For example, undiscovered poor implementation can lead to Type 2 errors,
which means an observer can conclude a program is not effective when it might have
been, had it been implemented correctly (Latessa, 2018; Salisbury, 2015; Zajac, 2015). In
this situation, the failure is a reflection of a poorly implemented policy, and not
necessarily a bad policy (Miller & Miller, 2015). Stated slightly differently, it is not that
the program “did not work,” but that it “did not happen” (Van Voorhis, Cullen, &
Applegate, 1995, p. 20). Two, undiscovered poor implementation not only leads to
incorrect conclusions about the effectiveness of the specific policy being examined, but it
11

also leads to negative conclusions about the effectiveness of policy generally and
strengthens the “nothing works” mentality (Martinson, 1976; Zajac, 2015). Three, poor
implementation negatively affects the recipients of a program because they do not receive
the needed service or product (Latessa, 2018). For example, if legislation is drafted with
the intention of providing a benefit to a particular group and only some of the group
receives the benefit or some or all only partially receive the benefit, recipients are
negatively affected. This is worthy of discovery in and of itself. Four, understanding
implementation affects our ability to refine and improve policies and programs. Finally,
and very importantly, even proven programs cannot be taken “off-the-shelf” and
transported into different environments if we do not have a solid understanding of “how it
works” or making “‘what works’ work” (Lin, 2012; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003).
Implementation studies help close the gap between research as it exists in controlled
settings and reality as it exists on-the-ground so that this can be done (Gottfredson &
Gottfredson, 2002). Ultimately, this makes policy more useful and responsive to the
problems it seeks to address.
Implementation evaluations are difficult because implementation often occurs in a
black box (Latessa, 2018; Mears, 2010; Zajac, 2015). Qualitative research methods can
help peer into this box and therefore are particularly well-suited for this type of
evaluation (Miller and Miller, 2015). Some scholars, such as Miller and Miller (2015),
suggest the result of having too few qualitative researchers in criminology and criminal
justice is the scarcity of implementation analyses within the fields. This has resulted in
criminology and criminal justice frequently having to borrow implementation scholarship
from other disciplines. Miller and Miller (2015) also critique the implementation studies
12

that do exist within the fields but do not use qualitative methods, such as Duwe and Clark
(2015). Their overarching point is that some implementation failures are incapable of
discovery or are at least less likely to be discovered unless qualitative methods are used.
Previous policy evaluations have sought to identify factors relevant to successful
implementation in a variety of contexts. Particularly instructive is Ellickson and Petersilia
(1983), which was specifically in the criminal justice context and whose findings have
served as a foundation for other implementation studies in criminology, criminal justice,
and other fields (Smith et al., 2012). They used the case study method to examine the
implementation of 37 policy innovations across five states and eight counties. They
defined policy “innovations” as programs or practices that were new to an adopting
agency, and the innovations studied included nine victim or witness programs, 10
computer-assisted applications, eight targeted programs, and 10 offender programs.
Ellickson and Petersilia (1983, p. 22-23) termed their key findings “the six
correlates of successful implementation”: (1) an agency’s motivation at adoption (as
measured by whether the policy was initiated locally, dictated to the agency, or some mix
of the two); (2) top leadership support, director and staff commitment, and, if applicable,
external cooperation; (3) staff competence; (4) benefits that outweigh costs; (5) clarity of
goals and procedures; and (6) clear lines of authority. The researchers viewed
implementation as a process, and all of these correlates are dynamic except the first,
which is static and measured by whatever it was at the time of adoption.
Strategies were also identified that can be used to influence the six correlates
(Ellickson & Petersilia, 1983). These include providing benefits to those implementing
the policy (a particularly important strategy in criminal justice where innovations rely on
13

input from multiple organizations); involving key actors in planning and problem
solving; a flexible problem-solving process; phased implementation to build on prior
achievements; craft-learning to enhance staff competence (learning lessons from active,
local implementation of an innovation and disseminating lessons to employees);
continual planning; and regular communication. Finally, they identified three obstacles to
avoid: (1) symbolic participation of actors in the planning process or open-ended
participation, by which they refer to an unnecessarily prolonged planning period without
clear goals and an abdication of responsibility by top leadership; (2) a division of
authority; and (3) premature certainty and inflexibility injected into a policy.
While Ellickson and Petersilia’s (1983) analyzed the implementation of policy
innovations in criminal justice agencies, other researchers have examined the
implementation of school-based programs aimed at reducing behavioral problems such as
violence, substance abuse, and criminal activity generally (Fagan and Mihalic, 2003;
Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 2002). For example, Gottfredson and Gottfredson (2002)
identified four potential obstacles to the implementation of policy innovations when
examining 3,691 school-based programs: (1) organizational capacity; (2) organizational
support (training, supervision, principal support), (3) program features (manuals,
implementation standards, quality-control), and (4) integration into normal operations,
local initiation, and local planning. Similarly, Fagan and Mihalic (2003) evaluated the
implementation of Life Skills Training (LST), a three-year drug prevention program,
across 70 sites consisting of 292 participating schools and approximately 130,000
students. The LST was selected for analysis because of its inclusion in the Blueprints for
Violence Prevention Initiative, a series of 11 programs that have been subject to rigorous
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testing, demonstrated significant reductions in violence, and identified by U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention as suitable
for replication (see also Elliot & Mihalic, 2004, for a description of the initiative). The
most commonly identified obstacle to implementation was teachers not wanting to reduce
time that had historically been dedicated to core studies. This reflected a lack of buy-in
from the very persons responsible for implementing the program, a factor that is
commonly found to be important in the literature. Other obstacles included a lack of
support from some management, administrators, program coordinators, and instructors;
lack of instructor training; problems integrating a program into a site infrastructure; and
instructor turnover, a problem that can overlap with instructor training.
Mihalic, Fagan, and Argamaso (2008) built upon Fagan and Mihalic (2003) when
also examining the LST program over the life course of the three-year program at 105
different sites involving 432 schools. Many of the obstacles they identified overlapped
with those identified by Fagan and Mihalic (2003), such as integrating the new program
into the existing schedule (and in particular resolving tension with the time needed for
core classes); instructors not regularly attending all training workshops; student
misbehavior; program coordinator commitment and authority; school principal and
administrator support; and instructor support.
Mental health research has also sought to identify factors relevant to policy
implementation (Durlak & DuPre, 2008; Mancini et al., 2015; Nelson et al., 2013; Rapp
et al., 2009). Durlak & Dupre (2008) identified two broad sets of factors which affect
implementation and which they termed service delivery system factors and support
system factors. Service delivery system factors include characteristics of the innovations,
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organizational and community capacity, and service-provider qualities, whereas support
system factors include training, technical assistance, and similar influences. While Durlak
and Dupree (2008) identified and discussed these factors within the context of mental
health programs for children, Nelson et al. (2013) discussed them in a study of a housing
program designed to address homelessness and mental illness among adults and expressly
noted their relevance in that specific arena. Similarly, Rapp (2009) found the most
significant barriers to implementing evidence-based mental health policy included the
behavior of front-line supervisors, front-line practitioners and others in the agency, and
intra-agency synergy. Mancini et al. (2015) identified and categorized factors affecting
implementation as either state-level facilitators and barriers or organization-level
facilitators and barriers. State-level factors included the state mental health authority
(which would be translatable in another context to an applicable government agency
authority), financing, licensing process, and technical assistance or consultation.
Organization-level factors included middle and upper management, team leadership,
staffing, and change culture.
Stepping back from the more specific settings of schools or mental health and
looking at policy implementation at a broader level, Mihalic & Irwin (2003) examined
implementation in multiple contexts. The researchers expressly sought to differentiate the
study from Ellickson and Petersilia (1983), with its focus on law enforcement programs,
and Gottfredson and Gottfredson (2002) and others, with their focus on school-based
programs. Mihalic & Irwin (2003) examined the implementation of eight Blueprints
programs over two years at 42 different sites in the United States and across a wide range
of treatments, including prenatal and postpartum care, school-based programming,
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mentoring, family therapy, and foster care. The most important implementation factors
they identified were teaching assistance quality, inconsistent staffing, community
support, and program characteristics, such as quality of materials, time required,
complexity, cost, and flexibility. The second most important factors identified included
agency characteristics such as staff participation, communication, administrative support,
clarity of goals, clear lines of authority, program champions, financial support, and
political climate. Weaknesses in any of these areas would serve as an obstacle to policy
implementation.
Over the past decade, a number of criminal justice studies have examined the
implementation of innovative policies. Smith et al. (2012) was a case study examining
the Earned Discharge (ED) pilot program in California, which aimed to reduce the state’s
incarcerated population by reducing the timeframe during which a low risk offender
could be re-incarcerated for a technical violation while on supervision. ED sought to do
this by reducing the parole time from one year to six months, but the policy was never
implemented as intended and eligible participants were either not allowed to participate
or, even if they were, frequently were not released from parole at the conclusion of six
months. Smith et al. (2012) explained the implementation failure through a three-part
typology of context, capacity, and content. Context involved lack of local political and
law enforcement support, capacity involved a lack of leadership in the Division of Parole
Operations (DAPO) and its inability to clearly communicate the goals of the ED program,
and content involved confusion and disagreement among participating agencies about the
content of the program itself (see also Campbell, 2012; Lin, 2012; & Schoenfeld, 2012)
(discussing Smith et al., 2012). Similar content problems were encountered in California
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when attempting to implement a legally mandated substance abuse treatment program for
offenders, an experience studied by Wiley et al. (2004). There the treatment professionals
responsible for implementing the program made assumptions about the types of offenders
who would qualify for the program that conflicted with the assumptions made by judges,
the very persons responsible for sending offenders into the program.
Later in the same year as Smith et al. (2012), Greenwood and Walsh (2012)
published a study which they claimed was the first to examine how states promoted and
supported the use of evidence-based practices in the area of delinquency prevention.
Although the primary goal for Greenwood & Walsh (2012) was to measure the progress
of different states in adopting evidence-based practices, the researchers also identified
four obstacles to implementation: (1) when local investment is required but the benefits
accrue to the state; (2) when funding streams are already committed to other programs
and some of them are not evidence-based; (3) the complexity of coordination and
implementation; and (4) staff resistance to change (see also Bishop, 2012; Lipsey &
Howell, 2012) (discussing Greenwood & Walsh, 2012).
Contribution of this Dissertation
The subject of this study is the implementation of legislation, and legislation
leaves state and local officials with considerable discretion in promulgating and adopting
policies and programs to carry out legislative intent (Keiser, 1999; Persson & Goldkuhl,
2011; Riccucci, 2005). Unlike previous studies that used the case study method to
describe implementation factors and problems, this study used the grounded theory
approach and contributes a set of seven theories to inform future policymakers and
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researchers. Through using grounded theory, it does so using first-hand knowledge from
those in the field.
The researcher used the implementation perspective as set forth in Ellickson and
Petersilia (1983) and adopted by Smith et al. (2012). The implementation perspective
focuses on events after adoption of a policy or program and the actions of persons who
are responsible for implementation. Under this perspective, successful innovations rely
on changes in the attitudes and behaviors of actors charged with implementation and
ultimately make progress towards the stated goal. While Ellickson and Petersilia (1983)
recognize a small minority of innovations are ready-made at the time of adoption, most
are flexible and change can occur as circumstances require (Ellickson & Petersilia, 1983).
This should be no surprise. Even with established programs there is an ongoing debate
about the tension between fidelity, widely recognized as the most important indicator of
implementation, and adaptability. (Durlak & DuPre, 2008; Moore, Bumbarger, &
Cooper, 2013; Morrison et al., 2009).
A competing perspective is the adoption perspective (Ellickson & Petersilia,
1983). This perspective focuses on the development and dissemination of new ideas.
According to this perspective, the key determinants of successful implementation are the
characteristics of the innovation and dissemination process. Those who would implement
policy are viewed passively, and the assumption is that good ideas are self-executing.
Therefore, once knowledge about them is disseminated, good innovations will be
implemented as a matter of course. The researcher assumed that criminal justice reform is
not self-executing, as advanced by the adoption perspective, and therefore the postadoption role of relevant actors was explored.
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Research Questions
Based on the existing literature above, a central question to guide this research is
posed along with several sub-questions:
Central question:
Are there obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform legislation?
Research Sub-questions:
1. What are the obstacles?
2. How do these obstacles function?
3. Why are they there?
4. Why are they allowed to persist?
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY
Jock Young (2011) argued more theory is needed. The academic landscape, as he
saw it, was filled with quantitative research and analysis, but there was a void of
theoretical development to accompany these data driven inquiries. He created the visual
of the “datasaurus” to represent this problem. The “datasaurus” was the body of a
brontosaurus. The small head represents the paucity of theory in the field, and the
enormous body represents the repeated quantitative analyses of these same theories, of
which there are not enough, over and over and over again.
The datasaur, Empiricus Abstractus, is a creature with a very small head,
a long neck, a huge belly and a little tail. His head has only a smattering
of theory, he knows that he must move constantly but is not sure where he
is going, he rarely looks at any detail of the actual terrain on which he
travels, his neck peers upwards as he moves from grant to grant, from
database to database, his belly is huge and distended with the intricate
intestine of regression analysis, he eats ravenously but rarely thinks about
the actual process of statistical digestion, his tail is small, slight and
inconclusive.
(Young, 2011, p. 15) (italics in original).
This dissertation seeks to be a part of the solution to that problem by offering a set
of theories in the fields of criminal justice and criminology. Specifically, this dissertation
created a set of theories about the phenomena that act as obstacles to the implementation
of criminal justice reform. The following questions and sub-questions guided the
researcher in creating these theories:
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Central Question:
Are there obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform legislation?
Research Sub-questions:
1. What are the obstacles?
2. How do these obstacles function?
3. Why are they there?
4. Why are they allowed to persist?
The hope is that these theories can provide guidance to policy makers in other
states and the federal government should they be implementing their own reform
agendas, and to academics and other public policy researchers wishing to further explore
these topics in future studies.
A Historical Review of the Qualitative Approach for Developing Theory
The qualitative method of study was selected precisely because this method is
well-suited to developing theory (Tewksbury, 2009; Tewksbury, Dabney, & Copes,
2010). The methods used for qualitative analysis, such as interviews, often allow for a
deeper exploration of a subject than quantitative research techniques (Charmaz, 2014;
Creswell & Poth, 2018). This is, indeed, why qualitative approaches are sometimes
coupled with quantitative approaches, e.g., they allow the researcher to fill information
gaps left by quantitative instruments such as surveys (Harcourt, 2001; Mihalic, Fagan,
and Argamaso, 2008). Additionally, one of the primary reasons qualitative studies are
useful is because they give rise to the very theories that can later be tested using
quantitative methods (Tewksbury, Dabney, & Copes, 2010; Worrall, 2000).

22

The different qualitative research approaches that can be adopted include
ethnography, case study, narrative research, phenomenology, and grounded theory
(Creswell & Poth, 2018). Grounded theory is used here because it allows the researcher
to inductively and abductively (described below) construct a theory from data obtained
from persons in the field through interviews. Such a theory is therefore said to be
“grounded-in” (i.e., based on) the perspectives of the participants.
Grounded Theory: Its Early History
Grounded theory has intellectual foundations in the pragmatism and social
constructivism of the University of Chicago and the positivism of Columbia University
(Charmaz, 2014). It is a merging of these two worlds. Pragmatists are of the view that the
value of a theory rests in its ability to be applied in a practical setting. They are also of
the view that reality is subject to multiple interpretations and fluid. Early pragmatist
scholars from the University of Chicago and others who influenced pragmatism include
well-known names within academia such as Charles S. Peirce (1878/1958), George
Hebert Mead (1932, 1934), and John Dewey (1919/1948, 1925/1958). Pragmatism
provided the basis for symbolic interactionism, a term coined by Herbert Blumer, who
was Mead’s intellectual heir, and it is a theoretical perspective that reality is subjective
with no deep, underlying truth to be discovered. Instead, reality is constructed through
our interactions and use of language. “Reality” changes over time and is dependent on the
person being asked.
In addition to the pragmatist and social constructivist underpinnings to grounded
theory provided by the Chicago School, it also provided a foundation for qualitative
methods through its use of life histories and cases studies in the early decades of the
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1900s, and by the 1940s, participant observation (Charmaz, 2014). Problematically, while
the Chicago School laid the groundwork for qualitative approaches through its use of life
histories, case studies, and participant observation, the guidance scholars provided on
precisely how to conduct this type of research was opaque, and absent from discussion
was a precise articulation of field methods or any type of systematic approach.
Positivism supplied the other key foundation to grounded theory and came from
the influence of Columbia University (Charmaz, 2014). Positivism enjoyed an explosive
growth in the twentieth century and stressed systematic observation, replicable
experiments, confirmed evidence, and falsification. Importantly, positivism also assumed
an unbiased and passive researcher who could separate facts from values – a point that
will be challenged by many modern-day grounded theorists, as discussed below. It was
generally accepted at the time that application of these tenants provided the only method
by which information reliable enough to be considered scientific or semi-scientific could
be discovered. Positivism was associated with quantitative research, and by the mid1900s, deductive quantitative research methods held complete dominance over inductive
qualitative methods, which were frequently dismissed as anecdotal, biased, and
unsystematic to such a degree as to render the research not reliable enough to be used as
the basis for scientific inquiry. The result was a large imbalance between the number of
quantitative analyses versus theory development, leading to Young’s (2011) datasaurus.
It was against this backdrop that Glaser and Strauss introduced their book, The
Discovery of Grounded Theory, in 1967. This text, prepared after Glaser and Strauss
studied death and dying in hospitals in the early 1960s, codified the qualitative method
for the first time (Charmaz, 2001). They wanted to develop theory from data as opposed
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to deducing hypothesis from existing theories, and they believed codifying the qualitative
method was the best way to go about this.
Glaser had been trained at Columbia with its emphasis on positivism, and Strauss
at Chicago with its emphasis on pragmatism (Charmaz, 2014). This is how these two
orientations became merged in grounded theory (Charmaz, 2001). With Glaser’s
background in quantitative research, he emphasized the scientific method, objectivity, the
idea of the passive observer, replication, and the notion the truth is there, waiting to be
discovered. He also emphasized middle-range theories. These are theories of social
processes grounded in data, and they are distinct from the grand theories of mid-century
sociology that lacked a basis in systematically analyzed data. Glaser’s analytical
approach helped to codify steps for qualitative analysis, providing a template for other
researchers.
Strauss was influenced by the pragmatists’ philosophical traditions of the
University of Chicago (Charmaz, 2001, 2014). He adopted symbolic interactionism and
Chicago’s legacy of field research through the influence of Herbert Blumer and Robert
Park while studying for his doctorate. Strauss argued people are active agents in their
lives and not passive recipients of outside forces. He also argued that action was the
central phenomenon to assess. According to his philosophy, it is process that is more
important than structure because processes created structure, and not vice-versa. The
meanings we apply to process and structures are subjective and social and we create the
meanings through interactions and use of language. He was creative and free-thinking,
and often engaged in a process he called “blue skying” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 10) in which
he creatively imagined and teased-out linkages between concepts.
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Although Charmaz (2014, 2017) notes it was not until 1978 in Theoretical
Sensitivity that Glaser provided clarity to the precise steps involved in grounded theory,
The Discovery of Grounded Theory nevertheless was a demarcation point for a shift in
qualitative studies to a focus on methods. It is this shift that ultimately resulted in greater
acceptance of the qualitative approach as producing information subject to a sufficient
amount of scientific rigor and therefore reliable to a sufficient degree to contribute to
scholarly debate. Charmaz described this development as “revolutionary” (Charmaz,
2014, p. 7). According to Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Glaser (1978), grounded theory
has several key components including the simultaneous collection and analysis of data,
approaching analysis without preconceived codes and categories, constructing codes and
categories from data and not preconceived notions, the constant comparative method of
constantly comparing data, codes and themes, advancing theory development at every
step, writing memoranda to generate and synthesize ideas, and theoretical sampling for
theory construction.
Strauss and Corbin (1990) – the same Strauss who had been partnered with Glaser
– then introduced another version of grounded theory in Basics of qualitative research:
Grounded theory procedures and techniques. Although this text served as an official
break between the approaches of Strauss and Glaser, doctoral students studying under
both have reported observing a growing divide between the two years before the actual
publication of the book in 1990 (Charmaz, 2014). Strauss and Corbin emphasized
technical and systematic procedures instead of more flexible procedures that arguably
permit categories to emerge from the data (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Strauss & Corbin,
1998). Glaser (1992) critiqued Strauss and Corbin’s approach as too systematic and as a
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result forces data and analysis into preconceived categories (Charmaz, 2014). It is ironic
that Glaser, the positivist influenced scholar from Columbia whose analytical skills
contributed to the coding scheme of grounded theory, criticized Strauss, the pragmatist
scholar from Chicago who engaged in “blue-skying,” of ultimately adopting an approach
that is too structured. The Strauss and Corbin (1990) approach is mentioned only briefly
here to provide the reader with information about this version of grounded theory even
though it is not the version of grounded theory used in this study.
The Development of Constructivist Grounded Theory
In the wake of Strauss and Corbin’s 1990 publication, a number of grounded
theorists began to alter the approach yet again, this time away from the positivism
emphasized by Glaser as well Strauss and Corbin (Charmaz, 2014). Charmaz termed the
new approach that was developed “Constructivist Grounded Theory” (p. 14), and this is
the approach used for this dissertation. Lest this description of a move to a constructivist
approach and away from an emphasis on positivism be misleading as to how far scholars
ventured from earlier iterations of the theory, constructivist grounded theory adopted
Glaser & Strauss’s (1967) “original statement” (p. 12). This included an open-ended and
iterative approach that uses constant comparative methods (comparing data to data and
data to codes and codes to codes and codes to categories and categories to categories,
etc.) and inductive reasoning to identify emergent themes.
A marked difference between constructivist grounded theory and earlier versions
of the approach is that it emphasizes flexibility (Charmaz, 2014; Creswell & Poth, 2018).
Additionally, constructivist grounded theorists make different assumptions than
researchers using the Glaser and Strauss (1967) approach. Constructivist grounded
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theorists recognize and acknowledge the inherent bias of any researcher and reject the
idea of a completely neutral and value-free observer (Charmaz, 2001). They argue,
instead, that the researcher records the world as the researcher best sees it, but not
necessarily as a reflection of an underlying truth that has mystically arisen with the data
and would be discovered regardless of who the researcher is. In fact, they argue the
researcher will directly impact the data that is discovered and therefore the ultimate
“truth” that is discovered from it. Different researcher, different data, different theory –
this is a possibility recognized by the constructivist grounded theorist. In fact, Charmaz
coined the “Constructivist Grounded Theory” and used “constructivist” “to acknowledge
subjectivity and the researcher’s involvement in the construction and interpretation of
data” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 14). She advocated for an emphasis on the pragmatist roots of
grounded theory, and argued that finished theories are constructions of reality rather than
an exact reflection of it.
Although the reasoning used in constructivist grounded theory is frequently
termed inductive – and that is accurate – it also uses a lesser-known form of reasoning
termed “abductive reasoning.” Abductive reasoning involves identifying the most
plausible theoretical explanation from data by testing different possible explanations
(Charmaz, 2017; Reichertz, J., 2009; Richardson, R., & Kramer, E. H., 2006). This
requires moving back and forth between the data and possible theoretical explanations.
Charmaz’s (2014) version of constructivist grounded theory emphasizes
approaching the data without preconceived ideas and staying close to the data. Keeping in
mind the process from beginning to end of a project is iterative and not linear, Charmaz
recommends a process that moves from initially coding the data to focused coding to
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theory construction. Creating memoranda, i.e., “memoing,” to analyze data, codes, and
connections between and among them is the key part of the analysis that leads to
developing and constructing theory. Although memoing could be placed on a process
timeline between focused coding and theory construction, it is in actuality a process that
should be employed throughout the data collection and analysis process. Figure 2
provides a visual of the process as described by Charmaz (2014, p. 133) (crediting
Allison Tweed for constructing figure for Tweed and Charmaz, 2001, p. 133).
Figure 2. A visual representation of grounded theory.
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Explaining these steps in more detail, the first step in coding under the
constructivist approach is initial coding. Initial codes should hew closely to the data,
which may call for line-by-line coding. Charmaz (2014) recommends this occur quickly
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and somewhat spontaneously, and that the researcher code as much as possible in order to
leave all possible doors open for inquiry. Focused codes are a level of abstraction above
initial codes. This involves identifying the themes and concepts that are suggested by the
codes and the data on which the codes are based. Charmaz recommends looking for latent
themes as well as express ones, and she describes this as an emergent process. It is often
the case that initial codes become focused codes because of their significance and
theoretical reach, and it is a misconception that a code must occur repeatedly in order to
be emergent: “Not at all. If the code is telling, use it.” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 145). This
process of focused coding can also allow the researcher to discard with those codes that
are off-point to the emerging, strongest themes. Memoing is a process that engages the
researcher in analyzing the data and codes, and in so doing permits the researcher to
make connections and develop theoretical categories. There is no mechanical formula for
how a memo should be prepared. It is simply a process that permits the flow and creation
of ideas about the project.
Constructivist Grounded Theory as Applied to this Dissertation
Data Collection
The research setting was Mississippi. Mississippi was selected as an ideal
location for this research because it has been identified by Pew Charitable Trusts and
others as a leader in enacting criminal justice reform measures, and therefore the results
of this study should be informative to other researchers and policymakers implementing
reform in other jurisdictions (Leins, 2019; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2017a).
Data collection occurred primarily through interviews, although some participants
provided documentary evidence that was consulted when reviewing transcripts and
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preparing memoranda. For interviews, purposive sampling was used in order to identify
potential participants who were most likely to have relevant information (Charmaz, 2014;
Creswell & Poth, 2018). The potential participants identified included state legislators,
judges, prosecutors, public defenders, law enforcement, think tank policy analysts, public
policy non-profit members, state-wide policy group members, and a former inmate. The
persons who ultimately participated came from all of these categories and from all
geographic parts of the state. In many interviews, snowball sampling was also used to
identify additional persons who might have relevant information or to follow a particular
lead or line of thought provided by a participant.
All participants were required to sign a consent form before the interview. This
research began during the Covid-19 pandemic, and consistent with University protocol
then in-existence for human subjects research, all interviews were conducted via Zoom.
The interviews were recorded so that a transcript could be prepared. Only the researcher
had access to the recordings and the transcripts and they were kept in a secure location in
order to protect confidentiality. This research was approved by the Institutional Review
Board (Appendix A).
Charmaz (2014) is of the view that there is no minimum number of persons who
must be interviewed in order to have a reliable grounded theory. Rather, the researcher
should continue the process of interviewing more and more persons until the data reaches
a “saturation point,” which is when new data no longer inspires new thoughts or
connections relevant to the inquiry. As discussed by Charmaz (2014) and others, there is
no bright-line test for when this point is reached, and it depends upon the good faith
exercise of judgment by the researcher.
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Thirty persons were invited by email to participate in an interview, and 19 agreed.
One of the persons who agreed to an interview had to later cancel, with apologies, for
fear that participation would result in answers that would jeopardize the person’s
employment. The first interview occurred on October 2, 2020, and the last on May 14,
2021. With 18 persons ultimately being interviewed, this resulted in a participation rate
of 60%. The interviews lasted an average of 52 minutes with the shortest at 20 minutes
and the longest at an hour and 39 minutes. Consistent with grounded theory, open-ended
questions were used, and the researcher used a 10-question interview guide to provide
structure to the process (Tewksbury, 2013). The guide can be seen at Appendix B.
Attempts were made to elicit information in a way that would inform theory construction
without coaching by the researcher (Schein, 1999).
The 18 participants can be grouped into five categories: policymakers, defenders,
judges and administrators, prosecutors, and inmates. Some of the participants qualified
for more than one category, and this is reflected in Table 1.
Table 1 Participants by group categorization
Type of Interviewee
Defenders
Policymakers
Judges & Administrators
Prosecutors

Number
7
7
5
4

Percentage
39%
39%
28%
20%

Inmates

1

5%

There were seven policymakers, and they consisted of think tank and interest
group representatives, members of policymaking criminal justice groups or committees,
and a state legislator. There were also seven defenders, and they consisted of current and
former assistant and head public defenders. There were five judges and administrators,
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and they consisted of current and former judges and persons who served in administrative
capacities of some aspect of a program that is part of criminal justice reform. There were
four current or former prosecutors, and they were assistant district attorneys in various
parts of the state. There was one inmate, and he was housed at the Mississippi State
Penitentiary, known as Parchman Farm or Parchman.
Data Analysis
Although the constructivist approach to grounded theory is iterative, it still
loosely follows certain steps in an analysis process, beginning with data collection.
Unlike other approaches where all data is collecting before analysis begins, analysis
begins immediately with grounded theory so that it can inform future interviews and
allow for the testing of tentative theories as they develop.
The researcher followed that approach here by reviewing transcripts and initially
coding early in the process, as suggested by Charmaz (2014), to learn from the interviews
and be advised of possible questions in future interviews. As suggested by Charmaz,
gerunds were used for the initial codes because they give action and bring clarity to the
concepts in the codes. The researcher also continually created memos and diagrammed
connections between codes and concepts throughout the interviews and coding process.
For example, the researcher generated as many as 18 memos and 36 networks in Atlas.ti
to explore connections between and among codes and concepts. A reflexive journal was
kept to record impressions during data collection and methodological challenges and
successes, and a memo bank was also created to file and store all memoranda (Charmaz,
2014; Creswell & Poth, 2018; Lopez & Emmer, 2000). A triangulation process was used
throughout the process by comparing interview results to information contained in
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documents such as state legislation, reports of reform efforts, and academic studies
(Lopez & Emmer, 2000). This process ultimately yielded 50 initial codes, which can be
seen along with a definition for each in a codebook at Appendix C. Ten focused codes
were then identified through this same analytical process from the 50 initial codes. These
ten focused codes are described in the section detailing results. It was after focused codes
were identified that the researcher went about formally constructing the theories
described below, although these theories or portions of them were frequently tested on
researchers throughout the interview process. An example of the coding process and how
the researcher moved from quotations to initial code to focused code to theory can be
seen in Appendix D.
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CHAPTER IV – RESULTS
The 18 interviews that occurred from October of 2020 to May of 2021 involved
participants who were grouped into five categories: policymakers, judges and
administrators, prosecutors, defenders, and inmates. Fifty initial codes were assigned to
the testimony in the transcripts of these interviews, and through the iterative process of
analysis used in grounded theory, 10 focused codes were eventually identified from these
initial codes. These focused codes were clouding the data; creating requirements not in
statutes; failing to buy-in; failing to reinvest savings; missing targets (people, programs,
and places); missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform; non-cooperating defendants;
pricing people out; resisting institutions; and suffocating and overwhelming population.
Focused Codes Discussed
Clouding the data
Clouding the data refers to a lack of access to data at the state or local level.
Sometimes this is because data does not exist, while other times it is because it is not
shared. Five codes gave rise to this focused code: clouding the data, confusing
inconsistency across jurisdictions, failing parts of drug courts, failing to reinvest savings,
and needing oversight.
Participants saw the lack of data to access as problematic in several ways. A
primary one is the inability to adequately analyze policy without it. For example, one
critique of reform shared by some participants is that it does not reduce the frequency of
criminal activity. Rather, reform recharacterizes many offenses from felonies to
misdemeanors and in so doing artificially decreases criminal counts that only record
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felonies. So, for instance, it is not that people are not stealing with the same frequency,
but that the amount they are stealing is no longer considered a felony. To the owner of a
store, the theft is still a theft. It does not become less of a theft because the amount of
money stolen was recharacterized from a felony to a misdemeanor. But, at present,
participants claimed they did not have access to enough data to assess whether this
concern is even a valid one.
An additional problem is that the recharacterization not only has the potential to
artificially decrease crime rates, but it also potentially pushes the administrative handling
of these cases from the state to local governments. This potentially overburdens local
governmental entities such as municipal courts, justice courts, and county courts and jails
and results in the type of “system overload” theorized by Bernard, Paoline, and Pare
(2005). When this occurs, more cases enter the system than can be processed through it in
a timely manner, and this causes a backward pressure throughout the local criminal
justice system that results in an inefficient handling of cases.
Participants complained that a lack of access to data makes verifying the critique
about overburdening local governments very difficult. One seasoned criminal defense
lawyer who has been heavily involved in policymaking remarked:
We just don’t have good data right now on who’s in our jail. But there
was, there’s been no evidence, and PEER tried to, because they kept
bringing this up year after year that 585 pushed all of this down to the
local level. But PEER looked at it, there was a provision that if the, if the
local law enforcement could show an added cost, because of 585, they
could get state reimbursement. And no one ever made that claim, because
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they just couldn’t show that they were seeing increased jail time for people
because they get pushed down because of these cases, they get pushed
down as misdemeanors.
***
There’s no evidence that pushing them down to misdemeanors made them
put a burden on the local governments. But we still hear that. When I’ve
tried to bring up for discussion reclassification of simple possession and
what they did in Oklahoma and make it a misdemeanor, we get the same
thing that people there were saying: “Well, you know, that’s going to
burden the city court system or the Justice Court system.” But I don’t, you
know, I don’t know that that’s going to happen, you know. And then there
were others who said, “you know, well, if they’re just misdemeanors, then
they’re definitely not going to agree to go to drug court. That’s gonna
really get fewer people in drug court, and that means we get less money
for drug court.”
Another veteran policymaker provided the following insight to this same theory:
Remember a lot of things are now misdemeanors that used to be felonies.
So once again, and I haven’t seen any numbers on the impact that’s having
in local communities. But you remember there was some grumbling from
law enforcement some time ago that all you’re doing is sending your
problems to us that these are going to be and the problem with that is the
databases out there for ascertaining what’s going on at the Justice Court
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level and municipal court level and county court level are not that good.
So it’s really kind of hard to come up with something.
Another policymaker and defense lawyer responded as follows to a question of
whether a lack of technology served as a barrier to data collection:
But what we hear from [drug courts] is that some of it is technology. Some
of it is, you know, the person, you’ve got to have somebody collecting the
data, and reporting the data at the local level…we went to the legislature,
NASS, the ASC, to collect data on indigency. How many lawyers, I mean,
we literally, when we did a case study, we had to call every circuit clerk
and then double check it with a court administrator to get a percentage of
people who had public defenders, because there’s not, there’s no data
collecting there. So there were some problems, I think, with the collecting
and reporting from all of these various courts around, and then, you know,
you do have to have the infrastructure there.
There is also the problem of criminal justice agencies not wanting to share
information even when they have it. A policymaker and defense lawyer offered:
I’ve got some nonprofits that I asked for some data on a project we’re
working on together, and you know, they’re like, we got to, you know, all
very polite, but, you know, I’ve got to get approval for that. You know,
because everybody wants the final data report that says they’re doing
everything right. To go public, but they don’t want to share the data on the
front end without knowing the answer.
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The lack of access to data is incredibly problematic because it cripples the ability
criminal justice professionals, policymakers, researchers, and the public to systematically
analyze data and render scientifically reliable judgments about whether policies are
working as intended. For example, it is entirely possible that reform measures have
overburdened lower courts at the municipal, justice, and county court levels, but it is also
unknown because the data is not there to analyze. If reform has overburdened lower
courts, that would mean reform has achieved the opposite of one of its intentions, which
was to provide for the speedier resolution of criminal cases in line with the constitutional
right to a speedy trial. Transparency is needed.
One final remark on transparency that came from a participant law enforcement
officer who stated the following regarding body cameras:
I’ll tell you, for a police reform, body camera has been huge. And you
know, nationally, it’s been a great thing, you know, because not only are
we capturing, you know, what exactly occurred, you know, whatever it is,
a lot of times we’re getting evidence for the crash or investigation. And
then when you talk about complaints, there’s been five more times than
not, the person comes in and complains, watch the video, and it’s not what
happened.
Creating requirements not in statutes
Creating requirements not in statutes refers to extra-statutory requirements
imposed on persons as part of their participation in a reform measure or program. These
extra-statutory requirements make the reform measure or program more stringent or
“narrow” in scope than intended such that fewer people qualify for participation or
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completion. For example, according to participants, some drug courts imposed extrastatutory requirements on participants by adding unnecessary rules, and agencies
promulgated regulations or adopted policies that constricted the reach of reform statutes
such as those dealing with parole. This focused code was comprised of five codes:
creating requirements not in statutes, failing parts of drug courts, missing the target
audience, needing oversight, and pricing people out.
With respect to the extra-statutory requirements imposed by some drug courts,
one policymaker and defense lawyer stated the following (the name of the particular
county is redacted in order to protect the identity of the participant):
The other thing that really bothered me, when I looked into
_______County, is I asked them for copies of their rules and regulations
and the individual rules that they had for people, some of them are just
silly, like, you can’t date without permission from the judge, can’t get
married without permission. Some of these things are unconstitutional.
You can’t wear jewelry. It was a bunch of just silly shit. The thing
that really concerned me, and I think they’ve solved this problem now, but
at the time, you couldn’t be on any prescription medication, which meant
that if you had a mental health issue, and a lot of people who struggle with
addiction do, you had to come off of your medication. It’s totally
counterproductive.
This ability of some drug courts to impose extra-statutory requirements and veer
away from best practices was attributed by one policymaker to a lack of needed
oversight:
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So, under statute, the Supreme Court is charged with certifying local drug
courts and ensuring that they’re operating according to best practices. And
there are a few people who are employed in the Supreme Court whose job
it is to do that. They are governed by a drug court advisory board set up in
statute, which is staffed by judges who obviously have an interest in
whatever their interest is. And so they have not actually done what this
actually has charged them with doing, which is visiting these local drug
courts, ensuring that they’re operating the way they should be, and
shutting down the ones that aren’t. And so you have, for instance, bad
drug courts that aren’t really helping anybody.
Earned discharge credits were an example of an agency adopting policies that
constrict the reach of a reform statute to make it narrower than intended. Earned
discharge credits enable those on supervision (probation or parole) to shorten their time
through compliance with program requirements. According to a policymaker and defense
lawyer, earned discharge credits arose in Mississippi because the federal government and
many states, including Mississippi, took note that most problematic behavior by parolees
and probationers occurred in first couple of years. Governments nationally reacted by
reducing the maximum supervisory period that could be imposed on an offender to
relieve the state of the burden of monitoring the person over a longer period than
necessary and to relieve the person of the financial obligation. Mississippi already had a
probation maximum of five years, which was not considered extraordinary. Therefore,
the state took a slightly different approach, and a better one in the opinion of a policy
maker and defender participant, by striking a balance with graduated sanctions for
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supervision violations (the stick) and also earned discharge credits to reduce the
supervision period with good behavior (the carrot). The participant reported that the state
constricted the reach of this statute when it bent to pressures from prosecutors and local
governments that needed the revenue stream from supervisees and discontinued earned
discharge credits for some period of time after having adopted them. He qualified this
observation, however, by stating he is not certain what the state is doing today. He
described the situation as follows:
But the first opposition we ran into, and I’m not sure what MDOC is doing
today, but MDOC ultimately decided that they were going to not fight the
prosecutors on this…Congressman Guest was the leader of this
movement, when he was still a DA in Madison County…the problem that
a lot of prosecutors saw and local governments…say, you know, when
somebody gets sentenced, particularly to probation, they get loaded up
with fines. And you can pay your fine over time…And the probation
officer collects it. And so you’ve got this really good collection service,
because the PO, they get the money, they turn it over to the
county.…There was a lot of fear that, you know, if you let these people off
probation earlier, then they’re not going to pay their fines…And so they
were trying to get the legislature to not allow earned discharge credits if
the person was in arrears, on their fines and fees, and ultimately MDOC
adopted a policy that said that they were not going to give out discharge
credits. So it’s sort of extended the amount of time people were on
probation earned discharge credits.
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A final example of creating requirements not in statutes involved judicial
interpretation of the statute regarding technical violations of probation and parole.
Criminal justice reform changed the law regarding revocation to apply graduated
sanctions for supervision violations such that a first violation could result in 90 days in a
Technical Violation Center (TVC), the second 120 days in a TVC, and the third the
remainder of a sentence in prison. The intent was to prevent technical violations from
quickly sending a person back to prison.
According to one policymaker and defense lawyer, some judges were interpreting
the statute to allow them to “stack” technical violations that were part of one revocation
hearing in order to sentence the person to the remainder of their time. This struck the
participant as not consistent with the intent of the statute:
So the other thing that judges started doing is what we called stacking
before. Because of the way the statute was written where it said for your
first technical violation you can get 90 days, rather than saying, for your
first revocation for technical violations, people would come in and the
judge would say, “Well, you didn’t pay your supervision fee, you had a
dirty test, and you failed to report for two weeks, that’s 1, 2, 3 technical
violations.” And the way the law says is your first technical violation, it’s
90 days, your second one 120. And your third, you can give the balance of
the suspended sentence, the judges would just go 123, I’m sending you
back to prison for the balance of your sentence.
According to the participant, this practice was ultimately appealed to and upheld
by the Mississippi “Supreme Court, with what I thought was a relatively disingenuous
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opinion. But not a completely unreasonable one, given the language of the statute.”
However, it was later remedied by the Mississippi Legislature with H.B. 387 where “they
solved the problem. Now, the statute clearly says, you know, for your first revocation for
one or more technical violations, maximum penalty is 90 days.” This obstacle is
noteworthy both for the fact it was an obstacle and that obstacles can be remedied later
through the representative democratic process.
Failing to buy-in
Failing to buy-in refers to persons who influence the implementation of criminal
justice matters and oppose reform or parts of reform because they philosophically
disagree with it or are skeptical of it. It is comprised of twelve codes, i.e., believing CJ
reform should look different, believing in CJ goals that conflict with reform, creating
requirements not in statutes, disagreeing with a reform measure, disagreeing with a
program purpose, disagreeing with program substance, exercising racism, fearing crime,
fearing people on drugs, ignoring reentry, misunderstanding reform, and viewing
skeptically because of experience.
One prosecutor succinctly captured two objections to reform by remarking that
victims get lost in reform debates and reform often does not decrease the frequency of
criminal incidents. It simply changes the way they are counted, a point discussed above.
But right now, we’re on defense, because they’re trying to monkey with
our habitual offender statutes, that’s really the only hammer we have left.
Keep in mind, in this whole thing, you know, all prosecutors who have to
do this for a substantial amount of time really start to understand the
victims get lost in all of this.
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***
But, you know, if, if we want to change this, not just be talking, if
we want to change, in my opinion, it doesn’t happen by decriminalizing
criminal activity. That’s sort of like saying we’ve solved drunk driving by
raising the blood alcohol limit to 2.3. You know, it’s like, hey, DUIs have
fallen off 90%. But there’s still drugs out there on the road, you know
what I mean?…So, you know, we don’t need to decriminalize acts to solve
the crime problem. In fact, that only harms the innocent people, that harms
the people out there who haven’t done anything to anyone. They become
prey for these folks.
This prosecutor also voiced frustration that reform was misdirected towards the
wrong ends, and that more meaningful reform would be directed towards recidivism.
From his vantage point:
Your question was, what obstacles exist in the implementation of criminal
justice reform? And, again, this is just my opinion, but you know, that
presumes that it’s needed. And I’ll talk more about that in a second. You
know, to me, what needs to happen is to keep recidivism down and to keep
the percentage of our population from being locked up that’s currently
locked up. That’s the big thing to me. And so it takes many, many forms,
but our criminal justice reform happens every year in the legislature, every
single year. Could you say that the key is to keep the people that need
locked up, locked up? No, no, the key is to prevent recidivism. And to not
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have the percentage of our population incarcerated that’s incarcerated
now.
***
So, you know, I think if people really, really want to make a
difference, and really want to figure out what policies we can change,
we’ve got to look at states that have implemented programs where
recidivism is low. You talked about having some measurables. And I think
you’re going to find that what they’re doing is they’re investing in those
prisoners in those citizens to be productive citizens when they get out.
Now, are they all going to do it? No, you know. Are most going to do it?
Probably not. But if we reach the quarter to half, I think it’s worth the pain
and suffering that we put our victims through, and the money we have to
spend on housing when they offend again.
He finished discussing this topic with this sobering observation, but also
reiterating that recidivism should be a focus. The name of the county has been redacted to
protect the participant’s identity:
But the problem that I’ve seen in my 20 something years is almost a
sociological one, which I don't think can be handled through legislation.
You look at Mississippi and all the stats, and we’ve got one of the highest
percentages of our population incarcerated. We’re probably one of the
more poorly educated states, probably an extremely high percentage of our
populations on some form of government assistance. We have a higher
rate of poverty than most states. Higher percentage of single mothers,
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fathers not in their children’s lives. Like I said, it’s almost a sociological
problem when you have that gumbo, all those ingredients for that gumbo.
You’re having folks that are going to commit crimes. And it’s not black,
it's not white. I mean, I’m down here in ______ County. There’s not a
black person down here. But it’s all the same problems. It's a lack of
education. It’s meth everywhere. It’s not getting trained up properly. So
what I think, and I think other prosecutors do, is the biggest reform we can
do is to help the felons before they get out.
To be clear, many actors within the criminal justice system do support reform
efforts as a general matter, and this includes persons within the prosecutor group. One
sheriff of a large county remarked:
I think in a lot of cases, [criminal justice reform] is very, very helpful.
Because here’s, here’s what I think that was changed that was not only
helpful but needed, right. And it’s like I mentioned before, throw
somebody away for 25 years on an auto felony, misdemeanor, marijuana,
whatever, I think is a waste of time and space. A crack dealer, a crystal
meth dealer, they really impact the community. I don’t think weed
smokers impact the community…I think part of the reason why we’re in
this particular shape with criminal justice reform is because back in the
80s, prior to me, and when I don’t remember. If my recollection is correct,
they did something called the 85% rule. Something like that. Right. So if
you if you committed a crime and with a gun, you were required to do
85% or your time. And also, if my recollection is correct, probably about
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five, six years after that, it’s my recollection the population of Mississippi
Department of Corrections went up, probably 50-60%. So now you’re
stuck with all these folks doing sentences. And when you’re doing this
legislation, I don’t think you’re thinking about where are you going with
medical and all these other costs that occur when your incarceration rates
goes up. So I think it was situation back then where I think the general
consensus was, let’s just show everybody how hard we can be on
criminals. But as a corporate cost, incarceration long term is a very
complex issue that people really need to totally digest. So I am just saying
this, I think that it turned into a monster. Now it costs a lot of money.
The fact that there are actors within the criminal justice system who oppose and
support reform simultaneously demonstrates the complex nature of the environment and
difficulty of reducing everyone’s viewpoint to a single current of thought. The important
point for purposes of identifying obstacles to implementation is that even if there are
numerous actors within the system that support reform, the various components of the
criminal justice system are disconnected enough that those who oppose reform are often
able to hinder the implementation of different aspects of it. Additionally, even among
those who generally support reform, the reasons for their support vary and this may result
in varying degrees of support or opposition for specific components of reform.
Failing to reinvest savings
Failing to reinvest savings captures the idea that the legislature has failed to
reinvest financial savings from reform and this has hindered full implementation of
different reform programs and policies, such as drug courts and mental health measures.
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This focused code was comprised of failing parts of drug courts, failing to reinvest
savings, non-cooperating defendants, pricing people out, starving for dollars, and
suffocating and overwhelming population.
A recurring theme among participants about the varying wish-list programs that
could be financed is that there is not enough money available: “The [] thing we run into is
that there’s no, there’s no real funding out there in Mississippi for any of this,” according
to a judge and former prosecutor, or “once again, money is always a constraint,”
according to a policymaker. According to some participants, at least some of these
programs could be financed if savings were redirected to them.
A policymaker was succinct:
One of the assumptions behind 585 was that any money we saved from
corrections would be reinvested in the community and community-based
programs. And one of the things that we’re concerned about on the
taskforce is that we’re not seeing reinvestment.
Another policymaker and judge was straight to the point:
So the biggest complaint I’ve heard about 585, was that we, we realized
the savings, um, because we had less people under the care of the state.
But we’ve never reinvested the monies from 585 that we realized. And so
we’ve continued to cut MDOC’s budget, but we haven’t increased their
budget for programming, which we could have done because we realized
the savings because of it.
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He added that while reform legislation did not mandate savings be
reinvested, it would be a prudent use of tax dollars and would also be exercising
fidelity to how reform legislation was marketed, providing in part:
I don’t think they were tied [to reinvesting] by law. I think it was more the
way we sold those programs was saying we’re going to save money, and
we ought to reinvest that in programming. The legislature increasingly
does not like to do things to tie their own hands. They like to have every
year freedom to make decisions about how they allocate money. And so I
just I think that’s probably what happened. I’d be surprised if there was
actually a legal requirement that they reinvest the money.
Another policymaker and defense lawyer had thoughts on the particular uses of
any reinvestment dollars:
Justice reinvestment that was a big thing, you know, we’re going to save
this money. But we don’t want to save it and put it in the general fund or
do a tax rebate, we want to invest it. And so the thing is, is that some
people thought reinvestment meant reinvesting in other aspects of the
Department of Corrections. And there was some truth to that. There
needed to be, there needed to be a shift from institution to community
corrections. We needed to spend more money on community. I think the
TVC is a justice reinvestment program.
Most of that reentry work, and most of that justice reinvestment
needs to go to our mental health system, the community mental health
system, the unconstitutional system that we have, according to Carlton
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Reeves. It’s, we knew, you know, we knew a lot of people coming into the
criminal justice system, because they have mental health problems, a lot of
people getting out of prison, who have mental health problems. So when
we improve the community mental health centers, that’s justice
reinvestment, that’s, that’s, you know, a recidivism reduction program.
Yet another policymaker remarked on the difficult politics involved in redirecting
savings and coupled the observation with a potential solution going forward:
The state spends a lot of money from a percentage basis on corrections
already. And it’s a tough sell to argue for reinvestment and any sort of
reentry programming. Drug court, I think, has the money, that comes back
to an administration problem. But yeah, it can be tough to get the funding
you need for some of this stuff. But, you know, with, with the right
mindset, the Department of Corrections, if we could actually implement
some more sentencing reform to allow them to decrease their population,
you could redirect a lot of the funding they have now to better uses than
just hiring more guards.
The idea at which he was driving is that so much money is already dedicated to
corrections, even post-reform with savings, that it is difficult to convince lawmakers to
take those savings and keep them in the corrections field for a treatment-preventative
purpose. The idea he was pushing is that we need more sentencing reform, or full
implementation of sentencing reforms that have already been enacted. Implicit in this
idea is that further population reduction will take us below some yet-to-be-defined
threshold of total spending that will then make it politically possible to make the case that
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savings should be reinvested into criminal justice related programs. Until that happens, at
least according to this participant’s perspective, it may be difficult to make the political
case for reinvested spending even if that means it serves as an obstacle to full
implementation of some programs and policies.
Missing targets (people, programs, and places)
Missing targets (people, programs, and places) has several dimensions and refers
to the idea that policies are missing the population to which they are directed, are directed
towards the wrong population, are using the wrong programs for the population, or are
hosted at the wrong location. It is comprised of eight codes: delaying on TVCs, failing
parts of drug courts, lacking programming substance, lacking systematic or scientific
rigor, locating programs in the wrong environment, missing marks on revocation reform,
missing the target audience, and needing oversight.
TVCs were a primary example of missing a target by locating a program in the
wrong location until the problem was eventually corrected. A policymaker and defender
observed:
The first setback for [TVCs] that we had was then under Commissioner
Epps. He had a plan. The plan, for whatever reason, was he going to put
the technical violation center over in Leake County on some land that the
state had near the Walnut Grove facility. And when they, for whatever
reason, they couldn’t get a state-local agreement going and they ended up
not putting it there and they wanted to get it started so they just put it in at
CMCF, and they just repurposed some of the area. And the first, the first
task force, we went a year before the taskforce started meeting, one of the
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first things we did was go visit the TVC. And it was just ridiculous. They
had, they had one large room, which was the classroom, and they had it
partitioned. And you had four classes going at the same time. And it just,
it wasn’t, it was just a holding place for 90 days that they got some
lectures and, and it took some time, but eventually, the department, and
this is one of the things that I think Commissioner Hall did really well,
was focused on getting the TVC up to what it was supposed to be where
people would go for 90 days, get some intense job training, or maybe it’s
drug and alcohol. But instead of sending them to Parchman for the AMD
treatment, that’s really not any good, they had them going through this
program. And you know, the one thing we haven’t seen, we haven’t
looked at data on the outcomes of TVC, since it got set up in Delta
correctional. But after a couple of visits there, especially for those of us
who went on that first visit, you know, it was night and day. And there’s a
lot, a lot of hope there that that program is working.
Another policymaker commented on this issue of the wrong location for TVCs, as
well as how TVCs continue to elude portions of the target population as a viable
alternative to reincarceration:
I think, initially, there were a lot of problems with the TVCs, and that they
just looked more like jails than anything else. And, you know, the intent of
those is to actually be more of a halfway house type situation. I think they
do look more like that now. There’s a lot we could talk about what
Commissioner Hall did wrong at the Department of Corrections. I think
53

that’s one of the things that they did right was improve the TVCs. And so I
think that’s a little better. There’s a bigger issue, and that relates to how
people end up there and why they end up there. MDOC still has a large
amount of discretion about how they apply these, you know, technical
violations for people who are on parole. Judges, and even the parole
board, in some instances, end up revoking people and sending them back
to prison for a lot of times what should be actually considered technical
violations, or they do so without actually holding a hearing and given the
due process that’s required when somebody is accused of committing a
new crime while they’re on parole. That is a problem still. It was one of
the things that was supposed to be addressed by 585. It is undoubtedly
better today than it was pre-585. But there’s still a lot of people who are
going straight back to prison on parole violations or probation violations,
where, you know, there’s some subset, probably less than 50%, but around
that number, who maybe shouldn’t be going back to prison and maybe
should be going to a technical violation center, or maybe shouldn’t be
violated at all.
Yet another issue appears to be a delay in persons reaching a TVC. According to a
policymaker and defender:
Another big problem they had at the beginning is the person gets arrested,
they sit in jail for weeks or sometimes months, then they go through
classification. And several months later, they finally end up at the TVC.
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And you really miss the opportunity to get this person turned around and
ready to get back out on the street.
Said another defender:
I have very few clients that even make it up there. They spend 90 days in
jail. Or 120 days in the county jail because there’s not enough, they’re not
transporting enough people due to COVID concerns, which understand
that the idea of a TVC is good, I guess…I don’t feel like people get there
fast enough.
One dimension of this focused code is using the wrong program for a population.
Consistent with this dimension, and in-line with a prosecutor’s observations above in the
focused code failing to buy-in about more focus needed on recidivism, the same
prosecutor observed:
If I could wave a magic wand, and it’s not going to happen because it
costs too much money, is we have, like, in their last year of, you know, in
prison needs to be in some sort of vo-tech halfway house, some sort of job
skill program that really can help them get a job.
TVCs were not the only program that received attention from participants. So too,
for example, did drug courts, which some participants believed missed targets by
admitting too many non-addicts as a get-out-of-jail free card or as a means to generate
revenue. According to a policymaker,
I will tell you what, I’ve seen more reformers who are no longer
supportive of drug court because of the data that’s coming out a lot of
these places. And so you see, and then this goes back to why drug courts
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are supposed to operate and how they actually operate. The point is to
address people with serious addiction issues that are leading them to
crime. But because of the fee structure that we talked about, and just the
discretion that comes to judges and prosecutors about who to get in there,
um, so for instance, if you get caught breaking into somebody’s house to
steal, to feed your drug habit, um, you’re probably less likely to get
accepted into drug court than somebody who just gets caught with
marijuana. So if you look at, and part of that is the incentive where judges
and prosecutors say well, that’s more serious, you know, you need to go to
prison for that, when in reality the point, the point of drug court is to
address those very people whose addictions are so severe, they’re creating
public safety problems. Um, but in reality, you know, a lot of people are
just getting in there who don’t really have, don’t really have a drug
problem. If you have a college kid that gets caught with marijuana, it’s
unlikely they’re going to create problems for the state long term, like
statistics.
All of these dimensions to missing targets (people, programs, and places)
serve as obstacles to implementation in different ways and for different lengths of
time.
Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform
Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform refers to the idea that reform efforts to
date have missed a major area of needed change, which is making changes necessary to
reduce the amount of time a person spends in jail before trial. This focused code is less
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about failing to implement a specific statute than it is reform legislation failing to address
a problem that is routinely recognized by reform advocates. In this sense, part of the spirit
of reform has not been implemented. It is significant because it raises constitutional
concerns and therefore it is discussed here. Additionally, it was voiced strongly as an
issue by a sheriff of a large county. It is comprised of the codes believing CJ reform
should look differently and missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform.
An interview with the previously mentioned sheriff crystalized this focused code,
although other participants voiced opinions that supported it in varying ways and to
varying degrees. The sheriff, grouped into the code group prosecutors, remarked:
What I would like to see, though, is more attention paid to what happens
pre-trial. Right. And I guess because it’s in our best interest as a
department to look at that. And I would like to see more done. Like we got
people down in the detention center now who have been down there more
than 1000 days. Right. Which I think according to the Constitution, that’s
a clear violation, you know, speedy trial, promise that you get as an
American citizen. So that, that part there is problem, is lack of governance.
The biggest problem that we face is just trying to get these people through
to justice. And we don’t have control over that. So the criminal justice
reform, most of the parts that I hear, it has to do with people that are
already incarcerated…I’d like to see more with pre-trial detainees.
These pre-trial delays were attributed to several factors. In some instances, it
could simply be judges or prosecutors not moving cases along as speedily as they could.
This might be due to a lack of diligence, while it might be due to case overload and the
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need for more judges, prosecutors, and defenders. Some of the delay also might be out of
the control of judges, prosecutors, and defenders. These factors out of their control
include delays in mental health evaluations that are backlogged in the mental health
system but necessary for trial, or delays in crime laboratory reports that are backlogged in
the state crime laboratory and are necessary for some prosecutions, particularly
homicides. While the diligence of public officials may be harder to address through
legislation than at the ballot box, legislation and legislative funding can address staffing
shortages and issues related to delays in mental health evaluations and crime laboratory
reports.
The sheriff continued, with the name of the county redacted in order to protect the
identity of the participant:
[I]n a lot of cases, there are certain individuals like right now, it’s about
125 people that we got down in the [jail], that are that are waiting for
mental evaluations…So how does that relate to your question about
criminal justice reform? Most of the time, when I hear people talking
about it, they’re talking about going back and looking at people who have
been sentenced.
***
And another thing on a state level that the legislature could do to
help _______ County, in particular with their criminal justice system, is I
mean, we need more judges…to handle this huge docket…they need to
statutorily change their allotment of judges for _______ County…because
I mean, if you think about it, we have people that are in our jail for three
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years, before they even see a trial. Mississippi does not even care about
speedy trial or nearly a speedy trial. So they’re in our system technically
innocent. Which I mean, you know, the rate of recidivism, if, if you’re in a
jail for one day to three days, I mean, it goes up exponentially as to
whether or not you’re going to come back. So we’re basically
manufacturing criminals.
This focused code of missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform captures an
important concept of needing to bring the accused to justice in a reasonably prompt
fashion to guarantee speedy trial rights, and even beyond fulfilling constitutional
guarantees, to provide for a more efficient and effective justice system. Allowing these
problems to linger serves as an obstacle to the implementation of the spirit of reform,
which widely embraces the view that pre-trial delays are too long and often extreme.
Non-cooperating defendants
Non-cooperating defendants refers to persons who choose not to participate in
reform programs for one a reason or another, such as a personal calculation that serving
time will be less onerous than compliance with a reform program’s requirements. The
codes comprising this focused code were creating requirements not in statutes, failing to
reinvest savings, non-cooperating defendants, and pricing people out.
This focused code was most frequently described by participants when discussing
drug courts. The idea articulated was that some defendants make personal decisions not
to participate in drug courts because they believe the requirements are more onerous than
other alternatives, even serving time. The point here is not to render a value judgement of
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whether these conclusions reached by defendants are reasonable under the circumstances,
but to note these conclusions are reached, reasonable or not.
A prosecutor observed:
They’re kind of smart, too. They know how much times over their head,
and they can figure it out. If they got two years left on drug court, I mean,
they don’t like it. You can’t have any fun. You can’t drink. You can’t do
anything. You’ve got to work. You have to be in bed at a certain time.
You have to wear ankle monitors and all that. No one wants it. Because if
they got two years of drug court to finish and they’ve got three years over
their head suspended, they’ll just go to the judge and tell them give me my
time. They’d rather go to a year in prison or less than to do two years of
having to live like drug court.
This was put to a follow-up question: “There really are people who would rather
do that?” Answer: “Yes, there’s a lot of people like that. And they know, they can
calculate in their head.”
An administrator and defender explained how this can work (with the county
name redacted to protect the participant’s identity):
This is another aspect of drug courts - why I don’t send my clients there.
You know, ________ County is notorious for lenient sentences. I don’t
know if that’s necessarily true. I think the volume – there’s no other
option, there’s just no other option. But if I’m facing, say, an auto
burglary. Okay. The maximum for auto burglary seven years. Well, if I’m
in drug court, I can be in drug court for a five full years, right. Okay. Well,
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if you want, I mean, this is an extreme, I’ve never heard someone say,
“well, I want to do the seven years on auto burglary versus drug court.”
But you would, logically, you would, because seven years, 25% of that
seven years is what? A year and eight months, a year and seven months,
and then you’re out.
This participant, who was very familiar with drug court best practices, added:
And that goes back to how long should a drug court be. The science is
very clear. We should be sitting at 18 months to two years. Well, that’s not
what the drug courts do in Mississippi [which is typically five years].
Some participant defenders perceived a pronounced reticence to participate in
drug courts from black defendants. They theorized there is a commonly shared belief
among this demographic group that drug court is the quickest way to prison because it is
too easy to run afoul of what are perceived as too many rules and regulations. This was
articulated by a defender during his interview (with the county name redacted to protect
the participant’s identity):
I mean, and I’ll say that it is, to me, it’s still this way amongst the black
community, probably in either jurisdiction [describing two neighboring
counties], the quickest way to get to prison is to go to drug court… I’ve
had a numerous clients, and you’ll hear it, it doesn’t matter black or white,
but I know that I’ve, the times I would hear it are more from a black
parent or our older sibling or uncle or you know, some kind of person
going to a drug court. I mean, that’s quick, so I get stuck in prison. And
it’s because you have all these hoops to jump through. And it’s hard. I
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mean it is in _________ County. The reason I think that it was not
recommended or that we did not encourage our clients to do it is because
if they qualified for the public defender’s office, they were struggling
financially and it required some financial means
There is overlap between this focused code and another focused code, pricing
people out. They are distinct enough that a decision was made that using different
focused codes representing each was justified because participants discussed numerous
situations where defendants did not cooperate for reasons unrelated to money. Sometimes
the decision not to participate or comply with a reform measure is about outright defiance
rather than a calculation of how onerous a reform measure may be. As told by a judge
and former prosecutor:
The one that stands out, in my mind the most. I had a young guy, tracking
firearms, which is a minimum of 15 years. He got a non-adjudication. And
I’ll never forget the probation officer standing up there saying, “I told him
come, you know, when can you come see? You name the day. You name
the time and I’ll be here.” Guy just wouldn’t come. And then the guy pops
off and he says, “Well, I’m clean, I haven’t been smoking weed.” And I
told him “I don’t care. I don’t care about your smoking marijuana. But
what I care about is you’re able to get to your dealer to buy weed, but you
can’t get up here to probation.” You know, I mean, that’s a problem. And
he didn’t show up for nine months.
That person went from a non-adjudicated sentence to serving 15 years in prison.
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This focused code may not seem intuitive or be the first obstacle that comes to
mind, but data from participant-interviewees indicates that reticence from potential
reform program participants can itself serve as an obstacle to implementation. This
speaks to a need to either adjust some program requirements or convince more people to
take advantage of reform programs, or both.
Pricing people out
Pricing people out refers to when some persons are priced-out of participating in
reform programs because they cannot afford the fees. It is comprised of the codes
exercising racism, failing parts of drug courts, needing oversight, and pricing people out.
There is overlap between this focused code and the focused codes failing to invest
savings and non-cooperating defendants, discussed above.
Drug courts were a primary example of a reform program that not all potential
participants can afford. Drug courts vary considerably from county to county because
individual drug courts have significant discretion in precisely how they are run and
financed. Some drug courts offer very affordable or largely free participation while others
do not. There were two main observations from participants about the effect of those drug
courts where participation is relatively costly: (1) not all who need it can afford it, and
therefore potential participants pursue other avenues when otherwise they would be an
ideal drug court candidate, and (2) this financial barrier falls more heavily on the black
population than others. Participants pointed to the demographics of drug court
participants as supporting this second conclusion.
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For example, a policymaker stated the following:
There are huge racial disparities. You are much more likely to get into
drug court if you are white. If you look at counties that have a pretty equal
balance racially, you’ll see most people who get charged with drug
offenses are African American. There’s a huge disparity there. You see
more people charged with drug offenses from the African American
community. That’s not new. But when you look at the people who make it
to drug court, it’s completely flipped. I mean, it’s like 60% white people
who get into drug court, and a lot of that is just a reflection of poverty.
You have to pay to get into drug court. In Mississippi, you have monthly
fees. You have to pay for all your testing that you have to do. If you can’t
afford it, then you’re not in. Some drug courts managed to make that more
equitable by, you know, the judges get to operate this fund however they
choose. And so a lot of them use it to cover their expenses, and create
scholarships with what’s left to allow folks who can’t afford it to get in.
Some don’t do that and sit on the money or spend it for other reasons. In
my mind, this is a prime example of what the Supreme Court should be
doing and going in and saying, hey, look, if your numbers don’t reflect the
people who are actually charged with these offenses, then you’re opening
yourself up to a federal lawsuit for you know, an equal protection
violation which has been threatened over this. But the Supreme Court is
not doing that. They’re shackled by the advisory board that’s run by
judges. And I think the only reason there hasn’t been a lawsuit about this,
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because it’s a pretty clear problem. And you’re, you’re precluding
someone from getting a benefit solely based on their economic situation.
And so the only reason that hasn’t been filed, I believe, is because they
don’t want to shut down drug courts completely, because we recognize
that it does help some people.
Another policymaker and defender had similar remarks:
585 gave [drug courts] a bunch more money because they weren’t giving
them enough money to begin with. So again, the state money and started
with some requirements of them using best practices and implementing
some standards. And then as we looked at it over the next couple of yours,
the eye opener for me was when we got them to report to us the data that
they’re supposed to report every year. There was, I think it was 63% of the
people in drug court were white. And, you know, people who’ve studied
drug abuse know, you’re as likely to use drugs, maybe slightly more
likely, but about the same white or black. We’re all doing drugs. And, and,
you know, we know, there’s, maybe because of policing practices, and it’s
just, you know, if you’re doing them hanging out on the street corner, as
opposed to doing them in your living room, you’re more likely to get
arrested. So, so there’s some statistical changes, things that come into play
that explain why in Mississippi we’ve got slightly more black people than
white people getting arrested for drugs. But then you turn around and look
at 63% of people in drug court. And nobody could explain that. And I
think that when you when you start looking at drug court and finding out
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all the fees, some of them were mandatory. They’ve made a way put a
waiver in giving the judge authority to waive fees. There were people that
if you had the money to pay for your assessment, you pay to get in. If you
need to and can pay for treatment, and then you could get in drug court.
And if you couldn’t do that, then you couldn’t get in drug court. So it
wasn’t a thing that drug court administrators were saying, you know, we
don’t like black people. We’re not going to let you in. It was all the system
was built up in a way that it was just going to be impossible for most of
the black defendants to get in.
These observations crystalized how fees can serve as an obstacle to persons
participating in reform programs when otherwise they might be ideal candidates. As
noted above, there is considerable thematic overlap between this focused code and failing
to reinvest savings and non-cooperating defendants. The overlap with failing to reinvest
savings is that savings could be redirected into programs such as drug courts so that
persons who are otherwise unable to pay fees could participate. Similarly, the overlap
with non-cooperating defendants is that many of these defendants do not cooperate and
participate for the very reason that they cannot afford to, and if the savings were
reinvested and therefore these persons were made able to afford to participate, then some
percentage of these non-cooperative defendants would presumably become cooperating
ones.
Resisting institutions
Resisting institutions refers to sectors or institutions within the criminal justice
apparatus opposing a reform. It was comprised of the fourteen codes believing in CJ
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goals that conflict with reform, believing CJ reform should look differently, creating
requirements not in statutes, curtailing judicial discretion, curtailing prosecutorial
discretion, misunderstanding reform, disagreeing with a reform measure, disagreeing
with program purpose, disagreeing with program substance, misunderstanding reform,
politicking and perceptions of political power, protecting their financial interests,
protecting turf, resisting institutions, and viewing skeptically because of experience.
Participants most commonly mentioned opposition to reform from prosecutors
and law enforcement, with judges also being mentioned frequently. According to one
policymaker:
I would say the biggest constituency that’s opposed to almost all this stuff,
all this stuff is the prosecutors and district attorneys. You know, they
generally are reflexively against any sort of criminal justice reform that
comes out of the legislature or is considered by the legislature. They’re
very active in lobbying. They’re at the Capitol every day during the
session. And they’re the ones who are really the leading constituency
against this.
This viewpoint was reiterated by two other policymakers. Said one in
response to a question about obstacles to implementation he had seen:
The prosecutors. So the law enforcement community has this paradigm
where, you know, initially, they say, look, we don’t make the laws, we
enforce the laws. But that’s totally not true. They are, law enforcement,
especially the lobbyist for the prosecutors and the Sheriffs Association.
The Chiefs of Police don’t seem to matter as much because they’re not an
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elected position. Like the chiefs of places, you know, anyway, they just
don’t have, the Chiefs of Police don’t have the same sort of political stroke
that the prosecutors and the sheriffs do. The sheriff is obviously a very
politically powerful position because it’s an elected official in a county
and the prosecutor because the prosecutors are elected as well.
Said another policymaker:
I generally think it is so ingrained in law enforcement and prosecutors, the
way they’ve been doing it. I don’t really think they see that there’s a
problem. Um, I, the way they resist change every single year to every
single reform with very few exceptions.
According to this same policymaker, much of this opposition is based on
reform making prosecution more difficult:
I mean, there’s just a practical reason that I’d also argue that they have
more of an incentive for, not for nothing to change in the criminal justice
system, but they stand to lose the most by any sort of sentencing reforms,
because it just, frankly, makes their jobs harder. If you have, if you have a
huge mandatory sentence to hold over someone’s head, it makes it much
easier to get a guilty plea right then than if they have parole eligibility,
and, you know, maybe they’re willing to roll the dice and actually go to
trial, if the sentence is not that tough. And so you have, I’m sure you’re
familiar with the trial penalty, where, you know, outcomes are worse for
folks who choose to exercise their right to a trial. And so I think that’s at
the heart of it. That’s, that’s where a lot of this opposition comes from.
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And so you see, prosecutors being the leading voice against a lot of
reform, because they just, from an incentive perspective, you know, just
makes their jobs harder.
According to another policymaker, the political power of the prosecutor and law
enforcement community is leveraged by law-and-order constituencies:
That’s what, that’s what a lot of this comes down to is that, you know,
there’s a, there’s a constituency of people who are just reflexively against
any sort of criminal justice reform. Within the legislature, I think those are
pretty small, outside, but they’re able to leverage, they’re able to leverage
some powerful interest groups, like law enforcement and sheriffs onto
their side. And, and that’s kind of, that’s the tension that exists.
A prosecutor participant shared the following regarding opposition to reform, but
he characterized the opposition as defense and noted prosecutors and sheriffs are the ones
who see criminals the most:
Every year we have to fight. We have an agenda, the prosecutors’
association, that we push that we want to see happen. And we’re usually
lockstep with the Sheriffs’ Association. You know, the two groups that
really see the criminals the most. And so, like right now, the last few
years, we’ve been on defense. That’s what we’re having to do. It’s all
money driven. And the 585 changes that happened, it did affect MDOC,
but not to the extent they wanted it to. They’re still, you know, packed in
there. And it just didn’t save the money they were hoping so they keeping
pushing for more and more things.
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But prosecutors are not always against reform measures. According to the same
prosecutor quoted above:
And what it, what [585] did, the whole goal was, as you know, was to get
people out of MDOC, or at least get them out of prison. They can still be
supervised and things like that. But it was cost driven. And we in the
Prosecutors’ Association fought this, law enforcement, sheriff’s
departments, they all fought it. We were able to get rid of some things. But
this was kind of shoved down our throats. And I have to admit, you know,
now after six, seven years of this, I like it, I like it a lot. It’s much more
fair [continuing on to discuss that sentencing reductions and parole
eligibility at 25% for nonviolent offenses and 50% for violent offenses
were more fair].
The code

misunderstanding reform was relevant to this focused code as

demonstrated by a policymaker when stating:
I think a lot of these sheriffs and police chiefs, when you sit down and
actually go through, you know, the actual content of these policies and
what they’re intended to do and how they’re implemented, you don’t meet
a lot of objection. I think that they are leveraged by a lot of people who are
just opposed to it in any form. And so that’s, that’s a lot of the tension at
play for sure.
Judges were also noted as hindering aspects of reform. For example, one
policymaker and defender discussed opposition from judges to reform regarding parole,
revocation, and the new use of graduated sanctions and TVCs:
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The thing that I want to emphasize is that judges are continuing to find
ways to get around these graduated penalties of 90 days, 120 days, and
then the balance of this suspended sentence.
Prosecutorial and judicial resistance was most frequently associated with limits on
discretion, and interviews revealed that opposition to the actual implementation of
specific reform measures was often associated with some type of financial interest.
Interviews also revealed that many prosecutors were not opposed to some aspects of
reform once it was more fully understood, but there also appear to be philosophical
divides on some points for which it will be difficult to bridge the divide between a more
law and order-oriented constituency and a reform one. Where the groups prosecutors and
judges and administrators can and do serve as obstacles to implementation is through
exercising power to constrict the reach of reform statutes within their sphere of influence.
Suffocating and overwhelming population
Suffocating and overwhelming population refers to a population too large for a
policy or program to be implemented successfully. It is composed of codes overloading
probation and parole officers, suffocating and overwhelming population size, and failure
to reinvest savings.
Probation and parole was the primary example. A participant from the judges and
administrators group identified the probation and parole population as entirely too large
for any probation or parole officer to have any realistic chance of providing adequate
services:
I’ll be frank, you want to talk about something doesn’t work: probation.
Probation and parole don’t work. It does not work. It’s a mathematical
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impossibility. I mean, I don’t pick on my probation and parole agents, but
if you run the math, I would be curious how many people each agent is
assigned to supervise. It has to be hundreds. It has to be in the hundreds if
you just look at the population that is technically on parole or
probation…But I mean, if you just look, if you say you have 300, 400
people on your docket as an agent, that you have to get reports for them
every month, and there’s only 20 working days in a month, you’re talking
20 people per day. On average. Probation really is you just show up, you
sign a piece of paper. That’s probation. Is that a deterrent? I mean, I end
up revoking a lot of people, though, because they don’t show up to sign a
piece of paper. And I mean, you know, I tell them on the front end, I’m
like, this is the easiest thing ever. You literally show up. I can’t revoke
you because you can’t pay. I mean, that’s against the law. You got to show
up and say “present.”
He later added about probation and parole officers:
I wouldn’t do it. I wouldn’t do it. I mean, I’m just gonna be frank, it’s, it’s
the worst job in law enforcement, other than being a prison guard. Other
than being a prison guard, it’s the worst job in law enforcement in my
opinion.
When suffocating and overwhelming populations are present, it serves as an
obstacle to implementation. There is overlap between this focused code and failure to
reinvest savings because arguably some savings could be redirected towards programs
such as probation and parole. This money could be used to increase the pay and number
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of officers, which in turn could increase the amount of time each officer dedicates to each
person and the quality of service provided to those serving supervisory sentences.
Between Group Comparison of Participant Groups
The five groups into which participants were categorized were policymakers,
judges and administrators, prosecutors, defenders, and inmates. After identifying focused
codes from all of the testimony of all of the participants, the frequency with which these
focused codes could be identified in the testimony of specific participant groups was also
determined. These were then rank ordered for each participant group by frequency.
Although constructivist grounded theory holds the frequency with which a code is
identified is not determinative of its ultimate significance in the larger picture, an
inference can be made that a topic is likely important if it is discussed repeatedly by
various participants. Below is a discussion of top three focused codes identified by each
group, and then a comparison of each group by these top three.
Top Three Focused Codes by Group
Policymakers. The top three focused codes discussed by policymakers were
failing to buy-in, resisting institutions, and missing targets (people, programs, and
places), as shown in Table 2. Failing to buy-in was discussed 81 times, resisting
institutions 66 times, and missing targets (people, programs, and places) 53 times. Other
top focused codes discussed by policymakers included missing the mark, needing pretrial reform (30 times), failing to reinvest savings (29 times), creating requirements not
in statutes (27 times), pricing people out (27 times), non-cooperating defendants (20
times), clouding the data (13 times), and suffocating and overwhelming population (12
times).
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Table 2 Focused codes by policymakers
Policymakers
Failing to buy-in

81

Resisting institutions

66

Missing targets (people, programs, and
places)

53

Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform

30

Failing to reinvest savings

29

Creating requirements not in statutes

27

Pricing people out

27

Non-cooperating defendants

20

Clouding the data

13

Suffocating and overwhelming population

12

Totals

358

Prosecutors. The top three focused codes discussed by prosecutors were resisting
institutions, failing to buy-in, and missing targets (people, programs, and places), as
shown in Table 3. Resisting institutions was discussed 31 times, failing to buy-in 19
times, and missing targets (people, programs, and places) 17 times. Other top focused
codes discussed by policymakers included suffocating and overwhelming population (14
times), pricing people out (11 times), creating requirements not in statutes (11 times),
failing to reinvest savings (8 times), missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform (8 times),
non-cooperating defendants (5 times), and clouding the data (4 times).

74

Table 3 Focused codes by prosecutors
Prosecutors
Resisting institutions

31

Failing to buy-in

19

Missing targets (people, programs, and
places)

17

Suffocating and overwhelming population

14

Pricing people out

11

Creating requirements not in statutes

11

Failing to reinvest savings

8

Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform

8

Non-cooperating defendants

5

Clouding the data

4

Totals

128

Defenders. The top three focused codes discussed by defendants were missing
targets (people, programs, and places), resisting institutions, and failing to buy-in, as
shown in Table 4. Missing targets (people, programs, and places) and resisting
institutions were both discussed 57 times, and failing to buy-in was discussed 47 times.
Other top focused codes discussed by policymakers included failing to reinvest savings
(31 times), pricing people out (31 times), creating requirements not in statutes (29
times), non-cooperating defendants (29 times), clouding the data (15 times), missing the
mark, needing pre-trial reform (11 times), and suffocating and overwhelming population
(7 times).
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Table 4 Focused codes by defenders
Defenders
Missing targets (people, programs, and
places)

57

Resisting institutions

57

Failing to buy-in

47

Failing to reinvest savings

31

Pricing people out

31

Creating requirements not in statutes

29

Non-cooperating defendants

29

Clouding the data

15

Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform

11

Suffocating and overwhelming population

7

Totals

314

Judges & Administrators. The top three focused codes discussed by judges and
administrators were resisting institutions, failing to reinvest savings, and missing targets
(people, programs, and places), as shown in Table 5. Resisting institutions was discussed
27 times, failing to reinvest savings 21 times, and missing targets (people, programs, and
places) 19 times. Other top focused codes discussed by policymakers included clouding
the data (18 times), failing to buy-in (18 times), pricing people out (18 times), creating
requirements not in statutes (16 times), non-cooperating defendants (14 times), missing
the mark, needing pre-trial reform (12 times), and suffocating and overwhelming
population (12 times).
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Table 5 Focused codes by judges and administrators
Judges &
Administrators
Resisting institutions

28

Failing to reinvest savings

21

Missing targets (people, programs, and
places)

19

Clouding the data

18

Failing to buy-in

18

Pricing people out

18

Creating requirements not in statutes

16

Non-cooperating defendants

14

Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform

12

Suffocating and overwhelming population

12

Totals

176

Inmates. The top three focused codes discussed by the participant-inmate were
failing to buy-in, missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform, and missing targets (people,
programs, and places), as shown in Table 6. Failing to buy-in was discussed four times,
missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform three times, and missing targets (people,
programs, and places) and suffocating and overwhelming population were both
mentioned twice.
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Table 6 Focused codes by inmate
Inmates
Failing to buy-in

4

Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform

3

Missing targets (people, programs, and
places)

2

Suffocating and overwhelming population

2

Clouding the data

0

Creating requirements not in statutes

0

Failing to reinvest savings

0

Non-cooperating defendants

0

Pricing people out

0

Resisting institutions

0

Totals

11

Comparison of the Top Focused Codes Identified by Group
Having identified the top three focused codes identified by each group, it is
possible to compare the groups to one another. This is shown in Table 7. Five of the
focused codes, i.e., clouding the data, creating requirements not in statutes, noncooperating defendants, pricing people out, and suffocating and overwhelming
populations were not discussed with enough frequency by of the participants groups to
make a top three, although according to Charmaz (2014) this should not be dispositive of
a focused code’s importance.
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Table 7 Comparison of groups by top three focused codes
Focused Code
Clouding the data

Code Group

Creating requirements not in statutes
Failing to buy-in

Defenders
Policymakers
Prosecutors
Inmates

Failing to reinvest savings

Judges and Administrators

Missing targets (people, programs, and
places)

Defenders
Judges and Administrators
Policymakers
Prosecutors
Inmates

Missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform

Inmates

Non-cooperating defendants
Pricing people out
Resisting institutions

Defenders
Judges and Administrators
Policymakers
Prosecutors

Suffocating and overwhelming population

Policymakers, prosecutors, and defenders share the same top three, i.e., failing to
buy-in, resisting institutions, and missing targets (people, programs, and places), but the
frequency with which each group discussed these three differed. For example,
policymakers discussed failing to buy-in the most, prosecutors resisting institutions, and
defenders missing targets (people, programs, and places). Based on characterizations of
each professional group, it is not difficult to theorize why these would be the top focused
code for each group. Policymakers would be likely take a global view and ascribe reform
resistance to those who “don’t understand” or simply do not believe in it. Prosecutors
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would be likely to resist as an institution because they have the most to lose through the
implementation of reforms that diminish their negotiating power with criminal
defendants. Defenders would be likely to believe in reform generally but also believe
reforms are missing the mark in some way based upon what they are seeing at the ground
level.
Like policymakers, prosecutors, and defenders, the testimony of judges and
administrators contained resisting institutions and missing targets (people, programs, and
places) with enough frequency to be two of the top three focused codes for the group.
However, judges and administrators differed from the other three groups by discussing
failing to reinvest savings with enough frequency to have it as the other top focused code
instead of failing to buy-in. Notably, failing to reinvest savings was identified by all
participant groups with the exception of the one inmate interviewed. It ranked fifth
among policymakers, seventh among prosecutors, and fourth among defenders (see
Tables 2-6). The inmate participant differed from all of the groups by discussing missing
the mark, needing pre-trial reform with enough frequency to place it among his top three.
Again, with constructivist grounded theory the frequency with which a focused
code is discussed is not determinative of whether it is the most important. However,
frequency can supply at least an inference that something important is occurring, and
frequencies are identified above for the purpose of highlighting topics which appear to be
important because they continued to arise in conversation.

80

Articulation of Theories
The purpose of this study was to build a grounded theory or theories that identify
and explain obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform. Consistent with
this purpose, seven theories have been developed by identifying themes underlying and
linking the focused codes discussed above. These seven are (1) failure to convince, (2)
failure to hit targets, (3) failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language, (4) failure to
make data accessible, (5) failure to reinvest, (6) failure to make programs affordable, and
(7) failure to address pre-trial problems. These theories are not listed in order of
importance. Additionally, one theory was identified that potentially had the most
explanatory power for capturing implementation obstacles in Mississippi. That theory is
failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language.
Theory 1: Failure to convince
Failing to convince persons with power of the necessity or benefit of reform will
result in persons and potentially institutions hindering implementation. This may seem
obvious, but it is worth articulating and amplifying because resistant individuals can and
do impede implementation. It is one thing for a reform measure to pass the legislature
with the majority required for passage. It is quite another for that measure to be
implemented by someone far removed from the legislature who may not agree with
reform and would have voted against it.
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 3. For figure and the other
figures used below that were created using Atlas.ti (Figure 3 – 9), a box with two
diamonds represents a focused code, while a box with one diamond represents an initial
code. The two primary focused codes from which the theory is formed are failing to buy81

in and resisting institutions. Both contribute to a failure to convince some persons of the
benefit of reform and thereby contribute to their hindering its implementation in some
way. The initial codes falling underneath those two focused codes that are pertinent to the
theory can also be in Figure 3. As can be seen, some of the initial codes are tied directly
to both focused codes, while other initial codes are tied directly to one focused code only.
Failing to buy-in and resisting institutions shared the initial codes believing in CJ goals
that conflict with reform, believing CJ reform should look differently, creating
requirements not in statutes, disagreeing with program purpose, disagreeing with
program substance, disagreeing with a reform measure, misunderstanding reform, and
viewing skeptically because of experience. The initial codes that were tied directly to
failing to buy-in only were fearing crime, ignoring reentry, and fearing people on drugs.
The initial codes that were tied directly to resisting institutions only were protecting their
financial interests, curtailing prosecutorial discretion, resisting institutions, protecting
turf, and curtailing judicial discretion. All of them relate in some way and degree to the
Theory of a Failure to Convince.
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Figure 3. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Convince.

In a sense this theory may serve to ratify that which people intuitively know to be
true, i.e., a failure to convince people of the benefit of reform will result in them serving
as an obstacle to it. However, it deserves mention and amplification because it is
ubiquitous.
Theory 2: Failure to hit targets
Sometimes reform policies and programs are directed towards the wrong people,
use the wrong programs, or are enacted at the wrong location. Whichever circumstance
applies, targets are missed and it will serve as an obstacle to implementation. Specific
examples illustrate how this theory works in practice. Housing TVCs in prisons, as
discussed above, is a perfect example of enacting a reform program at the wrong location
and thereby hindering full implementation. Sending non-addicts or persons without
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substance use disorders to drug courts is an example of applying a reform program to the
wrong people. This has the potential effect of not only taking spaces from those for
whom the program is intended, but also shifting the very focus of the program from a
serious rehabilitation program to a way station of sorts for those solely looking for an
expungement and clearing a record. Use of the wrong programs was less discussed by
participants, but one example that did arise was the inmate participant’s discussion of
alcohol and dependency treatment in prison, which he believed to be inadequate. These
examples illustrate how missing targets is an obstacle.
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 4. This theory is based
primarily on the focused codes creating requirements not in statutes and missing targets
(people, programs, and places). The initial codes associated with the focused codes and
relevant to the theory are also shown. The two focused codes share the initial codes
needing oversight, meeting the target audience, and failing parts of drug courts. The
initial codes creating requirements not in statutes and pricing people out were associated
directly with the focused code creating requirements not in statutes only, while the initial
codes delaying on TVCs, missing marks on revocation reform, lacking programming
substance, locating programs in the wrong environment, and lacking systematic or
scientific rigor were associated with missing targets (people, programs, and places) only.
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Figure 4. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Hit Targets.

Theory 3: Failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language
Requirements are sometimes imposed on persons during their participation in a
reform measure or program when the requirements are not found in the statute. When a
person with authority exercises his or her power to constrict the reach of a reform statute
so that it is narrower than intended by the Legislature, this is a failure to exercise fidelity
to statutory language. Examples of this included judges who “stacked” violations in
creative ways in order to trigger revocations to prison, drug court judges who imposed
requirements on participants regarding personal medication, and earned discharge credits
that at least for a time were reportedly not made available to those serving supervisory
sentences.
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 5. This theory finds its
foundation first and foremost in the focused code creating requirements not in statutes,
but it also received strong support from the focused codes clouding the data, failing to
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buy-in, failing to reinvest savings, missing targets (people, places, and programs), and
resisting institutions.
Figure 5. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Exercise Fidelity to Statutory
Language.

There can be overlap between the different theories set forth in this dissertation,
and that is certainly the case between this theory and others such as the failure to
convince, failure to hit targets, and failure to make data available. It is likely the case
that many of the very persons who impose extra-statutory requirements are also persons
who have not been entirely convinced of the merits of reform, that a failure to exercise
fidelity to statutory language can result in targeting programs to the wrong populations or
housing programs in the wrong locations, and that the inability of the public to access
data has enabled some actors to hinder implementation.
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Theory 4: Failure to make data accessible
You cannot improve what you cannot measure. Consistent with that oft-repeated
phrase, it is difficult to implement policy well or improve upon it when implementation
cannot be measured, and implementation cannot be measured without data. As stated and
repeated by participants in this research, much data that would be useful is in fact not
accessible, either by design or because recordkeeping practices or technology do not
make it possible. Such was the case with claims that reform drove the administrative
handling of criminal activity from the state to local governments and in the process
overloaded local systems. It was difficult to impossible for participants to ever assess the
validity of those claims because they lacked the data to do so. Regardless of why data is
not accessible, the lack of it serves as an obstacle to implementation. To more fully
implement reform, any jurisdiction overseeing it should look for ways to record data and
make it available.
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 6. The theory arises directly
from the focused code clouding the data. The initial codes underlying the focused code
are clouding the data, confusing inconsistency across jurisdictions, failing parts of drug
courts, failing to reinvest savings, and needing oversight.
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Figure 6. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Make Data Accessible.

Theory 5: Failure to reinvest
This theory is built directly from the focused code failing to reinvest savings. The
focused code is based on the idea the state should be taking savings realized as a result of
reforms and reinvesting them into criminal justice related programs. The theory is that the
failure to do so has prevented full implementation of reform measures, and examples
abound of where savings realized from reform could be reinvested into the system. For
example, some persons cannot participate in drug court programs because of fees.
Savings realized from reform could be redirected to reform efforts such as drug courts so
that all or at least more can participate. Other examples of where funds could be
reinvested include reentry and inmate training, the number and pay of probation and
parole officers, and addressing mental health care needs that often overlap with criminal
justice matters.
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 7. While this theory arises
directly from the focused code failing to reinvest savings, it is also finds strong support
from clouding the data, non-cooperating defendants, and suffocating and overwhelming
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population. Inability to access and review data may be preventing reinvestment that
might occur if it were accessible to be used to make a case for the prudential use of
taxpayer dollars through reinvestment, such as reinvestment to address unaffordable fees
that sometimes result in non-cooperating defendants and issues associated with
supervising large parole and probation populations.
Figure 7. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Reinvest.

The initial codes that are associated with these focused codes and relevant to this
theory are also included in Figure 7. There is considerable overlap between the initial
codes assigned to each focused code. A straightforward listing is that the focused code
failing to reinvest savings is associated with the initial codes failing to reinvest savings,
failing parts of drug courts, non-cooperating defendants, starving for dollars, and
suffocating and overwhelming population. The focused code non-cooperating defendants
is associated with clouding the data, failing parts of drug courts, and non-cooperating
defendants. The focused code clouding the data is associated with clouding the data,
confusing inconsistency across jurisdictions, failing parts of drug courts, failing to
reinvest savings, and needing oversight. Finally, the focused code suffocating and
overwhelming population is associated with the initial codes clouding the data,
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overloading probation and parole officers, and suffocating and overwhelming
population.
Note that one policymaker opined that politically it will be very difficult to
successfully argue that money should be reinvested in treatment-preventative programs.
This is because even after savings realized from reform and decreased allocations to
MDOC over the past several years, it is still the case that MDOC receives a substantial
amount of money each year as a share of the state budget. This was one reason why he
advocated for more sentencing reform as a means to further reduce the size of the
incarcerated population and perhaps then save enough that a better case can be made for
reinvestment.
Theory 6: Failure to make programs affordable
Reform will not be fully implemented if potential participants cannot enroll in
programs because of cost-prohibitive fees. According to participants, such has been the
case in Mississippi with reform programs such as some drug courts. One intent of
criminal justice reform is to decrease the likelihood a person will reoffend through
participation in applicable programs. This intent is not dependent upon economic class
such that only the more well-to-do are intended to benefit from reform. In reality,
however, reform participation becomes dependent upon economic class when fees are
unaffordable to significant segments of the population. Programs of course have costs,
and these costs have to be recouped from somewhere. This is where this theory overlaps
with the Theory of a Failure to Reinvest. Reinvesting could be addressed to programs that
are currently unaffordable to some by subsidizing their participation with savings realized
from reform.
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The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 8. The theory is grounded in
the focused codes creating requirements not in statutes, failing to reinvest savings, noncooperating defendants, and pricing people out. The focused code creating requirements
not in statute is associated with initial codes failing parts of drug courts, needing
oversight, and pricing people out. The focused code failing to reinvest savings is
associated with the initial codes failing parts of drug courts and pricing people out. The
focused code non-cooperating defendants is associated with the initial codes failing parts
of drug courts and pricing people out. As with the focused code creating requirements
not in statutes, the final focused code of pricing people out is associated with the initial
codes failing parts of drug courts, needing oversight, and pricing people out. To dispel
the thought that these two focused codes are measuring precisely the same thing, only the
initial codes relevant to this particular theory are included in the figure below.
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Figure 8. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Make Programs Affordable.

Theory 7: Failure to address pre-trial problems
Pre-trial problems remain unaddressed by reform according to participants. These
problems include lengthy waits for trial, which themselves are sometimes caused by
lengthy waits for mental evaluations or crime laboratory reports. This results in a large
number of persons who are housed in county jails awaiting trial, and it causes a number
of problems downstream in the criminal justice process. It is the corkscrew at the top of
the bottle that is causing pressure throughout, and it should be addressed. Unlike the other
theories, this theory does not deal directly with a statute that has been enacted and
blocked from implementation. Rather, it deals with an area that is serving as an obstacle
to the implementation of many other reform measures that address other parts of the
criminal justice process that are downstream from pre-trial delays.
The constructs for this theory can be seen in Figure 9. The theory is grounded in
the focused code missing the mark, needing pre-trial reform. The focused code is built
from the initial codes missing the mark, need reform for pre-trial issues for speedy trial
guarantee and believing CJ reform should look differently.
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Figure 9. Constructs for the Theory of Failure to Address Pre-Trial Problems.

Overarching Theory as Applied in MS
This dissertation sought to answer the following questions:
Central Question:
Are there obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform legislation?
Research Sub-questions:
1. What are the obstacles?
2. How do these obstacles function?
3. Why are they there?
4. Why are they allowed to persist?
The main question was posed because the researcher did not want to presume
there are obstacles, although it was expected there would be. Every participant in the
study confirmed they exist. As to the first two sub-questions of “what are the obstacles”
and “how to do these obstacles function,” the 10 focused codes answer these questions.
These codes (clouding the data; creating requirements not in statutes; failing to buy-in;
failing to reinvest savings; missing targets (people, programs, and places); missing the
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mark, needing pre-trial reform; non-cooperating defendants; pricing people out; resisting
institutions; and suffocating and overwhelming population) identify what the obstacles
are and the discussions above about the codes explain how they function. As to the last
two sub-questions of “why are they there” and “why are they allowed to persist,” the
seven theories developed from the 10 focused codes answer these questions. These
theories (the failure to convince, failure to hit targets, failure to exercise fidelity to
statutory language, failure to make data accessible, failure to reinvest, failure to make
programs affordable, and failure to address pre-trial problems) explain why the
obstacles are there and answer why they are allowed to persist.
This information can be synthesized into one overarching theory that potentially
has more explanatory power for obstacles in Mississippi than any alternative theory. That
theory is the failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language. Participants observed this
occurring in numerous places, e.g., drug courts with extra-statutory requirements, earned
discharge credits, parole violations triggering a return to prison instead of a TVC,
programs housed at incorrect locations, and programs targeted to incorrect populations.
Reform programs were applied incorrectly or in some instances were not applied at all.
Notably, however, there were several instances where implementation failures were
identified and corrected. The initial poor TVC location is a primary example. Initially, the
TVC was housed in a prison and this is precisely the place where it is not supposed to be
held. However, the facility was relocated to a community setting as intended by the
statute after a visit to the facility by the 585 Task Force and a change in MDOC
Commissioners. This serves as an example of how policy implementation is dynamic
instead of static and can course-correct over time.
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This overarching theory arises directly from the individual theory of failure to
exercise fidelity to statutory language, but other individual theories such as failure to
convince, failure to hit targets, failure to reinvest, and failure to make programs
affordable overlap with and contribute to the problem of not always adhering to statutory
language or intent. Additionally, it is also supported by several top focused codes
identified by participants, such as failing to buy-in, failing to reinvest, missing targets
(people, places, and programs), and resisting institutions. This theory more than any
other appears to explain implementation failures in those areas where they exist.
Several visuals help conceptualize this overarching theory and how it functions at
the ground level. Figure 10 illustrates a situation where a statute creates a reform program
and its requirements. Later, at the implementation phase, a judge or some other
government official imposes requirements on program participants that are not in the
statute or even contemplated by the statute through delegation. Drug courts were an easy
example of this for participants to discuss because there have been situations over time
where judges have imposed requirements on participants that had no statutory basis, such
as bans on dating and taking prescription medications for issues such as depression. This,
in effect, narrows the reach of the program to a smaller audience than intended by the
legislature, and this obviously narrows the number of persons who could be positively
impacted by such a program.
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Figure 10. Extra-statutory requirements that burden participation in programs.

Extra Requirements

Extra Requirements

Program Statutory Requirements

Extra Requirements
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Figure 11 illustrates the situation where a regulatory or judicial decision narrows
the scope of a reform statute. An easy to conceptualize example is where judges
“stacked” technical violations so that they could immediately revoke probation and send
an inmate to serve the balance of his or her sentence instead of routing the person to a
TVC. Another example is when MDOC reportedly discontinued, at least for a time,
earned discharge credits so that a person could not reduce the time spent on supervision.
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Figure 11. Regulatory or judicial decisions constricting the scope of a reform statute.
Statutory scope as
passed

Regulatory Decision

Judicial Decision

Statutory scope as
constricted

Yet another illustration of a failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language is
seen in Figure 12. This represents situations where a statute specified a program be
located in a particular type of site or target a particular population, yet this was not done.
For example, the initial location of TVCs in a prison setting is a prime but extreme
example. Prisons were precisely the location TVCs were designed to avoid because a
significant supporting rationale for TVCs is that technical violators do not need to be
exposed to the potentially criminogenic effect of prisons. Drug courts are an easy
example of targeting incorrect populations when they begin to be used for unintended
purposes, such as get-out-of-jail-free-cards for well-off college students caught with
small amounts of marijuana. These courts were intended for persons who face legitimate
addiction issues that could result in the person having a lifetime of legal problems that
often grow in severity over time.
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Figure 12. Applying the reform statute to the wrong location or population.

Required Location
Or Population
Statutorily Required Location
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Actual Location
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Suggestions for Testing the Theories
These theories should be tested through future research. Grounded theory is a
means by which to construct theory, and it does so from the data collected. It attempts to
construct reliable theories by testing the theories against the data it collects, but it is
constrained and limited by the very universe of data before it. The universe of data can
only reach so wide in scope in any given study and while the researcher attempts to
collect data to the point of saturation, other data might change the analysis. Future
researchers should test these theories against the data they collect to determine if they,
too, find these theories helpful explanations of how reform implementation is impeded, or
if modification or even discarding of the theories is needed.
The constructs for each theory were provided above in part to aid future
researchers in these efforts. The initial codes and focused codes that serve as building
blocks for the theories expressly show how the researcher categorized the data collected
and “built-up” to theory. The codes were expressly provided to, metaphorically speaking,
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show future researchers the cookbook for how the dish was made. Future researchers
using grounded theory to examine reform implementation should determine whether the
codes constructed in this study from this data also fit the data they collect, or if the codes
do not fit or they are identifying codes that are different. If the codes constructed in this
study do not fit their data or if they are identifying additional codes at the initial or
focused coding level, this may well impact the explanatory power of the theories
constructed in this study. It may also result in the construction of modified or new
theories. The use of the codes identified in this study for measurement in future research
is not limited to interviews in the style of grounded theory. For example, surveys might
well be used to measure the concepts captured by these codes and assess the strength of
these theories.
The point here is not to provide an exhaustive listing and full explanation of the
ways in which these theories should be tested, but rather to provide some suggestions for
starting points as to how they could be, and to emphasize that they should be.
Significance of Research
How This Research Develops and Extends Prior Academic Research
Past research has examined implementation failures in a variety of settings.
Ellickson and Petersilia (1983) was the seminal criminal justice implementation study
that examined numerous criminal justice innovations across a range of reforms. Smith et
al. (2012) and Greenwood and Walsh (2012) extended the research of Ellickson and
Petersilia (1983) by examining the implementation of very specific criminal justice
policies, with Smith et al. examining the earned discharge program in California aimed at
reducing supervision time and Greenwood and Walsh examining implementation of the
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Blueprint for Violence Prevention programs in a number of states. Gottfredson and
Gottfredson (2002), Fagan & Mihalic (2003), and Mihalic, Fagan, & Argamaso (2008)
also extended the research of Ellickson and Petersilia (1983), but did so in the
educational setting with an examination of the implementation of school-based policies.
This study differs from all of these in both its approach and its intellectual
product. It differs in approach because it applied constructivist grounded theory to create
a set of theories to explain how and why obstacles to implementation exist. Past studies
were generally case studies or reviews of case studies, and the different approach used
here created a different intellectual product by producing a set of theories that were
dynamic in nature rather than the static, descriptive factors identified in past studies. The
theories constructed in this study tell the reader precisely how implementation is being
obstructed, e.g., failing to exercise fidelity to statutory language, as opposed to
articulating a listing of static, descriptive categories under which a range of obstructions
might fall, e.g., insufficient communication, lack of leadership, divisions of authority.
At least two of the individual theories emanating from this dissertation make their
own unique claims because of their close tie to the modern criminal justice reform
movement. The failure to reinvest (Theory 5) and failure to make programs affordable
(Theory 6) were specific to the way reform was sold to the public on the front-end and
the corresponding inability to fully implement reform on the back-end. Although general
discussions about failing to reinvest in justice initiatives are not newly raised by this
research, the theory in this particular context is new because modern criminal justice
reform was sold to the public on the very idea that savings would be reinvested and that
this would, ultimately, return society to a prison population and incarceration rate that
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more closely resembled the world as it existed before the prison population exploded.
Now, according to participants, reinvestment is not taking place and it is preventing the
full implementation of the very reform policies the public was convinced it needed to
pass into law. The failure to make programs affordable is highly related to this, both
because reinvestment could be used to make these programs affordable and because
reform, as it was sold to the public, never hinged on a participant’s ability to pay.
Two theories that are relatively distinct from the other theories articulated in this
dissertation are failure to make data accessible (Theory 4) and failure to address pre-trial
problems (Theory 7). Although a lack of access to data was not identified as a major
obstacle to implementation in the academic literature reviewed, the participants in this
study are not the only observers to have identified this as a major issue for criminal
justice policy (Bach & Travis, 2021, Aug. 16). As Bach and Travis (2021) stated only
very recently, “Advocates for criminal justice reform from different fields and
backgrounds are all reaching the same conclusion: Any attempt at real, lasting change
will require a significant investment in our ability to collect, store, and share data.” The
failure to address pre-trial problems is not technically a failure to implement a reform
that has passed the legislature. It is more a reflection of what has not been done that the
legislature should do. It is mentioned here because it was identified by a now former
sheriff of a large county as a major oversight of criminal justice reform, and a problem
that, if it were addressed, could have major ripple effects downstream and positively
impact other problematic areas.
There is some overlap between the findings of this study and past ones, as might
be expected. For example, Theory 1 of this study, failure to convince, overlaps with
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Ellickson and Petersilia’s (1983) factors of sincere motivation at adoption, top leadership
support, and director and staff commitment because if these people have not been
convinced of the merits of reform, they will not have sincere motivation, will not support
it, and will not be committed to it. But the important point is this study offers
explanations for why these categories of obstructions exist, and in so doing, adds depth to
previous research in this area. As another example, for the overarching theory of failure
to exercise fidelity to statutory language (Theory 3), this dissertation is not the first to
pronounce that a failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language is a problem in the
public policy world. Entire texts have been written about the subject (Mears, 2010).
However, this dissertation theorizes that failure to exercise fidelity to statutory language
serves as a massive impediment to the implementation of modern-day criminal justice
reform. If this theory is valid, then the good news is that at least one fix is free. Simply
apply the statute as intended and the savings from doing so to a state could be substantial.
This is equally true for the related theory of failure to hit targets (Theory 2) where
policies fail to hit entire populations for which they were intended. This ties directly into
the next subsection and discussion, which is why this research matters to non-academic
criminal justice professionals.
Why This Research Matters to Non-Academic Criminal Justice Professionals
To harken back to a quote provided in the literature review, it is not that the
reform “did not work,” but that it “did not happen” (Van Voorhis, Cullen, & Applegate,
1995, p. 20). It would be a vast overstatement to proclaim that criminal justice reform in
Mississippi, writ large, “did not happen” because it was not implemented correctly. In
many ways it has been. However, participants identified specific areas where reform was
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not implemented as intended either by mistake of the person in charge or by design when
the person disagreed with some aspect of reform. In these particular instances, the reform,
in effect, “did not happen.” Cherry-picking which parts of a policy to implement matters.
As Duwe and Clark (2015) have shown, the difference between 80% of a policy being
implemented versus 20% is often determinative of whether the policy works at all. That
is to say, when a gatekeeper cherry-picks from a policy to implement only those portions
he or she agrees with, the consequence is often that the policy does not work. That is the
bad news, and practitioners should be aware of it. The good news is that as a practical
matter, perhaps the most promising aspect of a theory that failure to exercise fidelity to
statutory language has been such a moving force is that the cost to fix it is absolutely free
in real dollars. This is the biggest take-away for the practitioner from this dissertation. A
big impact can be made, and made relatively quickly, through simple application of
statutes as they were intended to be applied and without playing games to circumvent
their true intent.
A failure to make data accessible, failure to reinvest, failure to make programs
affordable, and failure to address pre-trial problems will all cost real dollars. While a
failure to reinvest might be viewed by some as not costing anything because it is merely
taking money saved by reform and directing it back into programs aimed at reducing the
size of the incarcerated population, others will likely take a different view. As one
participant who is active in legislative reform efforts for a think tank noted, there is a
belief among decision-makers that the state already contributes a significant sum
annually to the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Any request that includes
additional funds is almost destined to fail, at least according to this participant, and
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others. Some might object to using reform savings to expand programs as a back-door
method of expanding the size of government beyond that which existed before criminal
penalties became more punitive in the 1980s and gave rise to larger prison populations.
The argument from this perspective would be that all that is required today is a rollback
of the punitive nature of some penalties, and not an investment in services aimed towards
policy objectives such as reducing recidivism. Such an investment in services, the
argument would go, would put an obligation on the state that it never had before the rise
of punitive incarceration. All of this is to say that proponents should be prepared to make
a case for why front-end cost increases will result in back-end savings, and why the
expansion of government services in this area is a prudent use of taxpayer dollars that
will realistically reduce the size of the incarcerated population through reduced offense
rates. Otherwise, political realities will make resolving some of these obstacles very
difficult.
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION
The United States has an incarceration rate and prison population that exceed
other liberal democracies and most other nations around the world. This has gained
significant attention over the past two decades and is often referred to in terms of mass
incarceration or overincarceration. Criminal justice reform has been identified as one way
to address this issue, and it has risen in popularity across numerous states. This
dissertation used constructivist grounded theory to develop a set of theories to explain
obstacles to the implementation of criminal justice reform in Mississippi. Mississippi was
chosen as the study setting because the state has been recognized as a leader in enacting
criminal justice reform legislation and it has one of the highest incarceration rates in the
nation that has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world (FWD.us, 2020).
Therefore, since criminal justice reform seeks to address overincarceration, Mississippi
has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world, and the state is a leader in reform
efforts, it would seem to reason that reform could have a significant impact in the state.
Implementation evaluations have been performed with far less frequency than
outcome evaluations, even though it is widely recognized that implementation affects
outcomes. The implementation evaluations that exist do not provide a general consensus
regarding factors that hinder implementation. While implementation evaluations such as
Duwe & Clark (2015), Ellickson and Petersilia (1983), Greenwood & Welsh (2012), and
Smith et al. (2012) provided a framework for this research, those studies were case
studies or studies evaluating case studies and were not directly aimed towards theory
building. This study was, and it used constructivist grounded theory to do so.
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There have not been any studies identified that used grounded theory to develop a
set of theories about obstacles to the implementation of recent criminal justice reform.
Because this dissertation did, it contributes to the extant literature by offering a set of
theories that identify for policymakers and future researchers obstacles to the
implementation of reform that could occur in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, it provides
depth to the findings of previous researchers, such as Ellickson and Petersilia (1983), and
it offers new theories for why reform efforts are hindered and what to do about it.
Seven theories were formed by applying Charmaz’s (2014) constructivist version
of grounded theory: (1) failure to convince, (2) failure to hit targets, (3) failure to
exercise fidelity to statutory language, (4) failure to make data accessible, (5) failure to
reinvest, (6) failure to make programs affordable, and (7) failure to address pre-trial
problems. Failure to convince reflected persons and institutions who hindered
implementation because they were not convinced of its necessity or benefit. Failure to hit
targets symbolized policies and programs directed towards the wrong people, that use the
wrong programs, or are enacted at the wrong location. Failure to exercise fidelity to
statutory language represented imposing requirements not found in the statutes such that
it made it more difficult for persons to participate in a reform program or benefit from a
reform policy. Failure to make data accessible captured the notion that there is a lack of
data needed to make reliable assessments about implementation and outcomes. Failure
to reinvest was based on the idea the state should reinvest savings realized from reform
back into areas that impact criminal justice, such as hiring more parole and probation
officers, financing participation in reform programs that otherwise rely on fees, or
addressing pre-trial problems and delays not yet addressed by reform. Failure to make
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programs affordable signified instances where some persons could not afford to
participate in reform programs because of fees. Finally, failure to address pre-trial
problems reflected the failure of reform efforts to address the significant problems that
occur before trial occurs, such as delays in mental health evaluations and laboratory
reports.
An overarching theory was identified that had the potential to best explain
implementation obstacles in Mississippi. This was a failure to exercise fidelity to
statutory language. Participants discussed several examples of reform not being
implemented with fidelity to the text or intent of legislation and the result was that reform
programs did not operate as intended. The reasons for this varied. Sometimes it was
because a program was hosted in the incorrect location, such as when TVCs were initially
placed at a correctional facility. Other times it was because the reach of reform legislation
was “narrowed” by persons with authority adding extra-statutory requirements for
participation in reform programs. The researcher found additional support for identifying
this as an overarching theory based upon its overlap with the theories of failure to
convince, failure to hit targets, failure to reinvest, and failure to make programs
affordable. Each of these theories contributed to the problem of not always adhering to
statutory language or intent.
It is notable that on some occasions, implementation obstacles were identified and
remedied. This is consistent with Ellickson and Petersilia’s (1983) opinion that
implementation is a process, not static event, and improvements to implementation can be
made over time. An example of this is when judges “stacked” technical violations of
parole to end-run a reform statute that attempted to decrease the number of persons who
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were sent back to prison for technical violations. In that case, the Legislature passed an
additional bill, H.B. 387, that clarified that a revocation comprised of one or more
technical violations counted as only one technical violation. This can be the difference
between 90 days at a TVC and serving the balance of a suspended sentence.
This research is limited because it is uses one state as a study setting and it is
located in a particular geographic region of a large country. While it is theorized the
experience of Mississippi can be extrapolated to other states in other regions, “all
criminal justice is local,” as the saying goes, and there may be factors present in other
jurisdictions that diminish or discard with considerations that were present in this setting.
There is also an inherent limitation to grounded theory that is recognized by
Charmaz (2014). That is, grounded theory is limited by the very perspectives of the
participants upon which the researcher relies and the researcher’s interpretation and
recording of them. When participants provide observations, they can only relay the world
as they see it, but not all persons in the same situation would interpret the information the
same or even necessarily observe the same things. This is why, for example, although eye
witness testimony in criminal trials is the primary type of evidence offered against
defendants, it frequently provides unreliable and conflicting information and has been
cited as the number one reason for wrongful convictions (Scheck, et al., 2003). People
see things differently and sometimes inaccurately. Similarly, when participants provide
observations to the researcher, not every researcher will necessarily interpret and record
these observations in the same way.
The research was additionally limited by having less prosecutors and inmates
participate than persons from other groups. The researcher concluded this was a
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limitation more of optics than substance. The difference in numbers of participants
between prosecutors and policymakers, judges and administrators, and defenders was not
large. There were four prosecutors but seven policymakers and seven defenders. Judges
and administrators were closer with five. It was the researcher’s impression that
prosecutors as a group were less willing to participate in research of this nature, while
defenders and policymakers participated with enthusiasm. Perhaps this should not come
as a surprise given the nature of what the groups do professionally, e.g., it is often the
case the defenders see problems with the system because they are charged with defending
persons against a system that is accusing their clients of a crime or crimes. While only
one inmate participated, his participation was viewed more as a bonus than presenting a
problem of having only one inmate participant. It was entirely unanticipated there would
be any inmate participants, but an opportunity presented itself during the course of the
research to interview such a person. That said, his presence presents an issue with an
imbalance in participants, and future research may focus more on the perspectives of
persons who have personally been on the receiving end of criminal legal enforcement.
This segues directly into recommendations for future research, particularly those
applying grounded theory to discover implementation obstacles to reform. In addition to
potentially seeking more participants from the prosecutor and inmate groups, future
researchers may also want to examine specific programs. This research examined
implementation from a more global view by examining state-wide criminal justice
legislation regardless of a specific program or policy. The thought is that what is true at a
general level is likely also true at a specific level and that the results of this general level
research can inform efforts to implement specific policies. Future research might examine
109

specific areas of reform to learn about a particular area at a more granular level and to
transport those lessons to other specific areas. For example, in a jurisdiction such as
Mississippi where drug courts have largely been adopted, the implementation of drug
court statutes could be examined as a research project in and of itself. So, too, could the
implementation of statutes regarding TVCs, and other specific areas of reform. Although
the examination of specific programs would look more like some past implementation
research, applying grounded theory could set it apart and yield meaningful information
not previously discovered.
Finally, future researchers should test the theories formed from this research and
dissertation. Although this researcher tested the theories against the data obtained from
interviews for this study, future researchers should test the theories against the data they
collect. It is through the continual process of research and testing that we shall learn more
about how to successfully remove obstacles to the implementation of reform and criminal
justice policy generally.
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APPENDIX A – IRB Approval
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APPENDIX B – Interview Guide
1. What is your place of employment, title, and responsibilities?
2. What do you know about criminal justice reform in Mississippi?
3. Where have you seen it work well?
4. Have you seen it not work well in any areas?
5. Have you seen any barriers or obstacles to implementation of reform?
6. What are they?
7. How do they function as barriers or obstacles?
8. Why do they serve as barriers or obstacles?
9. Are the barriers or obstacles allowed to persist?
10. If so, why?
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APPENDIX C – Codebook
Code
Balancing “The Reformer
Dilemma”

Believing CJ reform
should look differently

Believing in CJ goals that
conflict with reform

Definition
When faced with a
situation to correct,
reformer activists must
always ask if seeking the
solution will result not in
achieving the solution but
rather an even worse reality
than the present, e.g., a
program will not be fixed
to address the perceived
problem, but will be
discarded in its entirety
resulting in no one being
helped at all.

Example Quotation
“It kind of puts the
reformers in a bad position
because, you know, you
run the risk of, if you try to
fix this, you run the risk of
eliminating these programs
in places. And so it’s a
tough question. Do you
want to deny this
opportunity to people who
can afford it, you know,
which might be the right
thing to do, just to ensure
that it’s supplied equally?
You do run the risk of
eliminating it for
everybody.”
A belief that reform
“But honestly, one of the
measures are not
biggest policy changes that
addressing the key issues,
I think would really benefit
lacking substance, missing the criminal justice system
their target audience, or are would be to a switch to
in some other way
appointed prosecutors and
deficient.
appointed sheriffs.”
A belief the criminal justice “That's what that’s what a
system should have goals
lot of this comes down to
that directly conflict with
is that, you know, there’s a
the spirit and goals of
constituency of people
reform.
who are just reflexively
against any sort of criminal
justice reform. Within the
legislature, I think those
are pretty small, outside,
but they're able to
leverage, they’re able to
leverage some powerful
interest groups, like law
enforcement and sheriffs
onto their side. And, and
that's kind of tension that
exists.”
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Code
Branding system as
“criminal legal system”

Challenging bureaucratic
hurdles

Clouding the data

Confusing inconsistency
across jurisdictions

Creating requirements not
in statutes

Definition
A belief the term “criminal
justice system” is a
misnomer, and a more
accurate descriptor would
be “criminal legal system.”
The existence of
bureaucratic roadblocks to
persons within the system
that make reentry more
difficult, e.g., not getting a
driver’s license before
release.

Example Quotation
“We have a criminal legal
system. We don't have a
criminal justice system.”

“And these sounds so
trivial, and yet they’re so
important. Getting a
person who’s released a
driver’s license or an ID
card. That sounds small,
but people usually can't
find work if they don't
have that.”
This refers to lack of access “The problem with that is
to data at the state or local
the databases out there for
level either because it is not ascertaining what’s going
shared or because it does
on at the Justice Court
not exist.
level and municipal court
level and county court
level are not that good.”
Program rules that vary by “So, one, drug courts help
jurisdiction. Drug courts
a lot of people and that
are a prominent example of they provide an alternative
this.
for somebody who would
otherwise be facing a
felony, and go into prison.
And so that's a good thing,
don't want to take that
away from anybody. Um,
they operate differently,
depending on what
jurisdiction you're in.
Some judges take this very
seriously and do a great
job with it. Some don't,
and don't really care.”
This refers to requirements “I asked them for copies of
imposed on persons during their rules and regulations
their participation in some
and the individual rules
reform measure or program that they had for people,
when the requirements are
some of them are just silly,
not found in the statute, i.e., like, you can’t date without
permission from the judge,
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Code

Curtailing judicial
discretion

Curtailing prosecutorial
discretion

Delaying on TVCs

Definition
extra-statutory
requirements.

Example Quotation
can’t get married without
permission. Some of these
things were
unconstitutional.”
Judicial resistance to
“The other side of the
reform on the basis the
obstacle was there was a
judge’s personal experience lot of resistance from
leads him or her to disagree judges. We had one judge
with reform.
who declared the TVC
program and limits that the
legislature put on them for
revocation
unconstitutional.”
Opposition to reform on the “The prosecutors’ ideal
basis it will curtail
paradigm is that they can,
prosecutorial discretion in
you know, charge
how to prosecute or
everyone with the death
recommend the sentence
sentence and then back off
for a crime.
of that, because their view
is, look, I’m the
prosecutor. I know what’s
right. And so the laws need
to give me maximum
punitive authority. Because
if I have maximum
punitive authority, then I
can do what I feel is right.
And if the lawmakers
don’t give me maximum
punitive authority, then
there may be a situation
that comes down the pike,
where I believe somebody
needs something that I’m
not allowed to give them.”
This captures an
“Initially, there were a lot
institutional bandwidth
of problems with the
issue. The concept for
TVCs, and that they just
TVCs was in the
looked more like jails than
legislation, but the
anything else. And, you
institutional infrastructure
know, the intent of those is
to handle the target
to actually be more of a
population was not. This
halfway house type
also captures the idea that
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Code

Disagreeing with a reform
measure

Disagreeing with program
purpose

Disagreeing with program
substance

Definition
some judges have searched
for ways around sending
inmates to TVCs so that
they can instead be sent
back to prison.
A disagreement with a
statutory change made by
reform legislation.

A belief that a program has
an unneeded purpose or a
purpose that runs contrary
to the person's belief about
what should be the goals of
the criminal justice system.
A belief a program should
be administered or taught
in a substantively different
way.

Diverting crises and mental Programs that have treated
health from jail
persons and situations
outside of the traditional
arrest and incarceration
approach.

Exercising racism

The idea that racism shapes
views about the criminal
justice system and
receptivity to reform.
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Example Quotation
situation. I think they do
look more like that now.”

“The eligibility for drug
court isn’t pretty. It used to
be pretty strict to get in.
And what they’ve done is
they’ve removed all the
barriers now….You can be
a drug dealer…And that’s,
that’s the worst idea.
That’s like a fox in the
henhouse.”
“So there’s not like a, a
consensus on what we’re
even talking about when
we’re talking about justice,
reinvestment or reentry
programs.”
“The RRP program that
was supposed to take over,
you know, all the research
points to doing these
recidivism reduction
programs outside of an
institution. But what it
really became was just a
substitute for RID, you
know, it was RID without
push-ups.”
“So, again, the whole law
enforcement community in
the county is part of this
program. So that’s one tool
that we can use. So we’re
not shipping somebody
that needs mental health
help to the jail.”
“In some ways, I don’t
think you can separate the
conversation about race
from criminal justice

Code

Definition

Failing parts of drug courts

Extra-statutory
requirements of drug courts
around the state that have
limited or damaged their
effectiveness.

Failing to reinvest savings

The notion that the
legislature's failure to take
savings realized as a result
of reforms and reinvest
them into criminal justice
related programs, such as
mental health and drug
courts, has hindered full
implementation of existing
reforms.

Fearing crime

The very fear of crime,
violent and non-violent,
can motivate some persons
to hinder reform
implementation.
The fear that some persons
have of other persons who
use drugs.

Fearing people on drugs

Ignoring reentry

The notion the state has
failed to take reentry
seriously and therefore has
failed to dedicate
meaningful programming
to those preparing to
reenter society.
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Example Quotation
reform in a state like
Mississippi with the
highest African American
population.”
“And that goes back to
how long should a drug
court be? Right? The
science is very clear. We
should be sitting at 18
months to two years. Well,
that’s not what the drug
courts in Mississippi do.”
“And by the way,
Department of Corrections,
since 585, has gone from
24,000 down to 17,000
inmates at a savings of I
can’t recall the specific
savings, but it is multiple
millions. Unfortunately,
we wanted those millions
and savings to put back
into corrections where we
need it. But that didn't
happen.”
“Fear is a big problem.”

“There are a lot of people
who are just afraid of
drugs. And there are a lot
of people who think our
drug laws actually prevent
people from doing drugs.”
“There’s not a whole lot to
talk about when it comes
to just programming that
the state does related to
reentry. I mean, the
Department of Corrections,
for the most part, gives
people $25 and a bus

Code

Injecting disruptive change
into the system with
reform

Institutional resistance

Lacking programming
substance

Lacking systematic or
scientific rigor

Definition

Example Quotation
ticket. And that’s, that’s
basically it.”
The idea that reform itself
“There was a lot of
can create hurdles to
concern about, you know,
administering justice
you’re not doing
efficiently, such as when
something about crime,
crimes previously
you’re just making these
designated as felonies are
property crimes
recategorized as
misdemeanors, and the
misdemeanors, which
theory was that going to be
pushes the handling of
a huge burden on the local
these offenses down to
governments because
local governments and
they’re not going to go to
potentially overburdens and prison, they’re gonna sit in
even overwhelms them.
the jail at the county
expense or the city
expense.”
Sectors within the criminal “I would say the biggest
justice apparatus opposing
constituency that’s
a change injected by reform opposed to almost all of
because it will modify their these stuff, all this stuff is
authority or responsibility
prosecutors and district
in some way.
attorneys, you know, they
generally are reflexively
against any sort of criminal
justice reform that comes
out of the legislature or
this considered by the
legislature.”
A program that is too
“That’s one of the biggest
“thin” on program
obstacles, you know, what
substance, e.g., a program
the problem is with these
where not much is taught,
we now called intervention
is entirely too short, etc.
courts, that I see is that
they’re really good at
supervision, but not really
good at support, or, or
treatment.”
The failure to adopt
“And it was just ridiculous.
performance measures or
They had, they had one
evidence-based standards.
large room, which was the
classroom, and they had it
partitioned. And you had
four classes going at the
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Code

Leading (or not) with
leadership

Leaning Lady Justice

Locating programs in the
wrong environment

Mimicking others’ models

Definition

Example Quotation
same time. And it just, it
wasn't, it was just a
holding place for 90 days
that they got some
lectures.”
The idea that leadership
“I think top leadership is
matters and sets the tone,
because top leadership sets
and that there have been
the tone. Okay, what are
shifts in policy emphasis
we about? They're the ones
with changing leadership.
who get to look at the
mission of the agency and
say, Look, the statute says
this, this, this, but this is
what we're going to
emphasize, these are the
most important things that
we do. And burl is talking
about preparing people for
reentry. And I don't
remember Chris ever
talking about [that].”
More resources are
“But in all honesty,
provided to the district
criminal justice reform
attorney offices than public starts with fully funding
defender offices.
the public defenders
throughout the state and
making full time offices
circuit-wide to parallel that
of the DAs office. That’s
where justice happens.”
Programs hosted in
“But it’s inside the
environments in which they institution, it really isn’t
were not intended to be
fulfilling a purpose of
hosted.
being an alternative to
sentencing people to an
institution read was, in
theory, an alternative.”
The notion that Mississippi “And basically, rather than
will borrow programs that
reinvent the wheel, we sort
work from other states and of plagiarized are pretty
implement them here rather good a lot with their
than attempt to recreate the consent. And it is a good
wheel.
bill.”
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Code
Missing marks on
revocation reform

Missing the mark, need
reform for pre-trial issues
for speedy trial guarantee

Definition
These were set-backs in the
implementation of
revocation reform
measures, such as housing
a TVC in a prison instead
of a community setting, and
the ways some judges
sought to still revoke for
technical violations by
aggressive interpretations
of revocation statutes.
Reform has been directed
towards crime-level
categorization (felony v.
misdemeanor), sentence
length, and at the stage of
incarceration through
release. This code
represents the argument
that more reform should be
directed towards pre-trial
issues, such as taking steps
necessary to ensure
defendants receive a speedy
trial, receive a timely
mental health examination,
receive a timely crime lab
report in a murder
investigation, etc.

Missing the target audience Applying a program to the
wrong people.
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Example Quotation
“That’s the thing that I
want to emphasize is that
judges are continuing to
get it find ways to get
around these graduated
penalties of 90 days, 120
days, and then the balance
of this suspended
sentence.”
“What I would like to see,
though, is more attention
paid to what happens pretrial…Like we got people
down in detention center
now has been down there
more than 1000 days.
Right. Which I think
according to the
Constitution, that’s a clear
violation, you know,
speedy trial, promise that
you get as an American
citizen…So the criminal
justice reform, most of the
parts that I hear, it has to
do with people that are
already incarcerated…I’d
like to see more with pretrial detainees.”
“Well, the drug court is,
though as the way it was
originally, originally
designed, and the way that
I think it’s trying to be
pushed there by the
Administrative Office of
courts, is that it is an
alternative sentencing. And
it’s a court of last resort.
What I mean by that is if I
get charged with
possession of cocaine, or

Code

Misunderstanding reform

Needing oversight

Definition

Example Quotation
possession of meth, or
even possession of
marijuana, because we still
we still charge people with
felony possession of
marijuana. Those people if
they’re a first-time
offender, they’re not
supposed to be in drug
court, unless they have
some type of record or
pattern where they need to
be in drug court.”
Areas where
“I mean, I think a lot of
misunderstandings of
these sheriffs and police
reform cause people to
chiefs when you sit down
oppose it from distrust or to and actually go through,
implement it in a way that
you know, the actual
does not correspond with
content of these policies
the intent of the reform.
and what they’re intended
to do and how they’re
implemented, you don’t
meet a lot of objection. I
think that they are
leveraged by a lot of
people who are just
opposed to it in any form.”
Programs that needed
“Some judges take this
oversight from a person or
very seriously and do a
body so that they could be
great job with it. Some
held to evidence-based
don’t, and don’t really
practices or as close to
care. And, um, the
evidence-based as
Supreme Court is charged
possible.
with certifying them and
applying best practices. In
my view, they’ve been
negligent in that duty and
have allowed judges to just
basically not run drug
court and just pocket the
money they’re getting
from people who are
participating.”
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Code
Non-cooperating
defendants

Overloading probation and
parole officers

Definition
Some defendants do not
want to participate in
alternative reform
programs and instead prefer
to be incarcerated.

Example Quotation
“And also they’re kind of
smart, too. They know
how much time is over
their head, and they can
figure it out. If they got
two years left on drug
court, I mean, they don’t
like, you can’t have any
fun, you can’t get cranky,
you can’t do anything. You
gotta be, you have to work.
You have to be in bed at a
certain time. You have
ankle monitors and all that.
No one wants it…They’d
rather go to a year in
prison or less than to do
two years of having to live
with drug court. So are
there people that would
rather do that? Yeah,
there’s a lot of people like
that. And they know they
can calculate their head.”
So many persons are
“I’ll be frank, you want to
assigned to probation and
talk about something
parole officers that it is
doesn’t work, probation
impossible the officers
and parole don’t work.
could contribute a
That does not work. It's a
sufficient amount of time to mathematical
each person to whom they
impossibility…if you run
are assigned.
the math, I would be
curious how many people
each agent is assigned to
supervise. It has to be
hundreds. It has to be in
the hundreds if you just
look at the population that
is technically on parole or
probation…say you have
300, 400 people on your
docket as an agent that you
have to get reports from
every month, and there’s
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Code

PEERing oversight

Politicking and perceptions
of political power

Preventing parole for
violent offenders

Pricing people out

Definition

Example Quotation
only 20 working days in a
month. You’re talking 20
people per day.”
In addition to its normal
“The people who drafted
role oversight duties, PEER 585 and crafted the section
has a specific oversight role on the taskforce decided to
over criminal justice reform make give the pier
in Mississippi through its
committee staff a position
seat on the HB 585 Task
on the task force.”
Force.
The perceptions of different “But the only frustrating
groups about the political
thing to me about criminal
power and allegiances of
justice reform is we, the
other groups and how that
people who work within
impacts the discourse
the system, they don't want
around reform.
to hear from us. They want
to, they want to tell us how
it's going to be. And that’s
fine. We’ll follow the law.
But the problem is, they
don't understand the reality
of some of this.”
There is a
“A lot of people rather
misunderstanding about
than reading the statutes,
how H.B. 585 applies to
read some newspaper
violent offenders. It does
reports about this 50%
not apply at 50% of
rule. Yeah, and started
sentence served as sold and telling their clients if
commonly thought, even
you're convicted of a
by criminal defense
violent crime, you can be
lawyers.
released after 50%. When
in fact, what it did is it just
raised the floor for all
violent criminals, and it
had no impact on the
people who are ineligible.
So, you know, armed
robbery was a day for day
sentence before 585 is a
day for day sentence after
585.”
This is when some persons “So you have to pay to get
are priced-out of
into drug court. In
participating in reform
Mississippi, you have
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Code

Definition
programs because they
cannot afford the fees.

Protecting their financial
interests

Actors within the criminal
justice apparatus that
hinder reform or thwart
potential reform because it
is believed it will threaten a
financial self-interest.
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Example Quotation
monthly fees, you have to
pay for all your testing that
you have to do. If you can't
afford it, then you’re not
in. Um, and so some drug
courts managed to make
that more equitable by, you
know, the judges get to
operate this fund however
they choose. And so a lot
of them use it to cover
their expenses, and then
create scholarships with
what’s left to allow folks
who can’t afford to get in.
Some don’t do that and sit
on the money or spend it
for other reasons. In my
mind, this is a prime
example of what the
Supreme Court should be
doing and going in and
saying, hey, look, if your
numbers don’t reflect the
people who are actually
charged with these
offenses, then you’re
opening yourself up to a
federal lawsuit for you
know, an equal protection
violation which has been
threatened over this.”
“One of the biggest
obstacles to any kind of
change, and it's not just the
criminal justice system,
but since that's where I
spend my whole life, I see
it in the criminal justice
system, is that, you know,
when you start affecting
money.”

Code
Protecting turf

Recategorizing non-drug
non-violent offenses

Definition
Actors within the system
who oppose a measure or
program because it will
affect their domain.
Discussions concerning the
recategorization of many
non-drug, non-violent
offenses from felony to
misdemeanor.

Reducing drug sentences to The idea, generally
be more “fair”
supported, that past drug
laws had sentences that
were too severe and varied
by drug in ways that
resulted in substantial
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Example Quotation
“And it all comes back
down in my opinion to
money and power.”
“If we want to change this,
just be talking if we want
to change, in my opinion,
it doesn’t happen by
decriminalizing criminal
activity is sort of like
saying, we’ve solved
drunk driving by raising
the blood alcohol limit. 2.3
You know, it’s like, hey,
DUIs have fallen off. 90%.
But there's still drugs out
there on the road, you
know what I mean? But,
but, but they’ll stand up
and beat their chests and
think that they’ve done
something. And what I
have found is it just creates
a more revolving door with
this 25% with, you know,
all this other stuff that
they’re implementing
changes for. So, you know,
we don’t need to
decriminalize acts to solve
the crime problem. In fact,
that only harms the
innocent people. That
harms the people out there
who haven’t done anything
to anyone they become
prey for, for these folks.”
“And, and when we start
talking about 585, you’ll
see the huge reform 585
was when it came to
sentences, especially drugs
sentences. You know,
before if you had cocaine,

Code

Definition
sentence differentials by
race.

Resisting the extra work
created by reform

Some persons may oppose
or hinder the
implementation of reform
on the basis it imposes
extra work with no
additional pay.

Starving for dollars

Resources matter, and a
lack of funds can prevent a
program from being
implemented.

Suffocating and
overwhelming population
size

Example Quotation
it could be a rock of
cocaine, it could be five
pounds of cocaine, you’re
going away for 30 years,
you had to 85% of it.
When, when this came out,
House Bill 585, it
significantly changed it, it
made it more fair, it went
ahead and made it weight
based. And so that was
really the big thing.”
“But I think a judge
doesn’t get paid an extra
dime for doing this. I get
no more money than if I
didn’t have a drug court…I
like to do it. But drug court
will take a minimum of
20% of my time. And I
think I’m conservative
there. Because it does. You
just got it. You either do it
because it’s a calling or
you like it and you believe
it’s helping your society or
not.”
“I mean, the state spends a
lot of money from a
percentage basis on
corrections already. And
it's a tough sell to argue for
reinvestment and any sort
of reentry programming or
drug court.”

“Yeah, the second thing
we run into is that there’s
no, there’s no real funding
out there in Mississippi for
any of this.”
The notion the sheer size of “Well, you just got to, I
a population is such that the mean, you try to give
successful implementation everybody their day in
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Code

Definition
of any policy that is
supposed to address that
population is very difficult.

Surviving the Willie
Horton effect

It only takes one bad case
with significant media
attention to potentially
derail a reform measure
that is a net positive.

Turning Points / Hooks for
Change

The idea that incarcerated
persons need a hook on
which to hang a turning
point for their life.
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Example Quotation
court and you try to you
try to hear both sides and
stuff. But then there’s
some days it’s just you’re
trying to move people
through the system as fast
as you can and be fair, it’s
difficult.”
“But I think part of the
problem people in the
criminal justice system
face is this. It's so easy for
the press to pick out one or
two incidents, and really
kill a program.”
“But listen, I'm not gonna
church it up too much.
Because I did have a heavy
drug problem. I wasn’t
doing the right things in
my life. You know, my,
my mom who loved me
dearly and was giving up
on me, you know, I was
working my lawyer to
death for seven years, you
know. So, you know, it’s
not like I was leading
church services or
anything like that all. I
deserved to go to prison,
honestly, if you if you
want me to say that.
Because, you know, a lot
of the things that I did, I
got away with, you know. I
was I was trying to support
a drug habit that had taken
me down dark roads. I
didn’t have God in my life,
I just, I wasn’t a good
person at all, you know, I
wasn’t necessarily a bad
person, but I just wasn’t

Code

Viewing skeptically
because of experience

Definition

Example Quotation
making right decisions.
And it’s for me, it’s about
that conscious contact with
God. And when I’m when
I’m still in my body with
drugs and alcohol and
other substances, I don’t
have that, you know, cuts
off. So it’s not like I was
this demon child, I just
didn’t have God in my
life.”
The experience of persons
“I've been doing it since
in the field causes some to
‘97. Probably the only law
be skeptical of some reform I need to ever do is
measures.
criminal law. And so I’ve
seen it, you know, the
pendulum swings, you
know, we’re gonna get
tough on crime. And then
jails go up. Now we’re
gonna let everybody out
and then the crime starts
going up. Yes, pendulum.”
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APPENDIX D – Coding Process
The process begins by applying initial codes to the testimony of participants. This
is performed when the researcher is reviewing the transcript of a participant’s testimony.
In this study, the researcher used Atlas.ti to review transcripts and apply codes. Initial
codes are the building blocks from which focused codes are constructed, and focused
codes serve as building blocks for the resulting theories. To demonstrate this process,
provided below are example quotations that were assigned to the initial codes pricing
people out and missing the target audience. Following these example quotations is a brief
description of how these initial codes fit within focused codes and how these focused
codes serve as building blocks for theory. These examples are intended to serve as brief
illustrations of how the researcher moved from interview transcripts to initial codes to
focused codes to theory.
The initial code pricing people out is defined as when some persons are pricedout of participating in reform programs because they cannot afford the fees. Three
example quotations for this initial code are as follows:
Quotation 1: There are huge racial disparities. You are much more likely
to get into drug court if you are white. If you look at counties that have a
pretty equal balance racially, you’ll see most people who get charged with
drug offenses are African American. There’s a huge disparity there. You
see more people charged with drug offenses from the African American
community. That’s not new. But when you look at the people who make it
to drug court, it’s completely flipped. I mean, it’s like 60% white people
who get into drug court, and a lot of that is just a reflection of poverty.
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You have to pay to get into drug court. In Mississippi, you have monthly
fees. You have to pay for all your testing that you have to do. If you can’t
afford it, then you’re not in. Some drug courts managed to make that more
equitable by, you know, the judges get to operate this fund however they
choose. And so a lot of them use it to cover their expenses, and create
scholarships with what’s left to allow folks who can’t afford it to get in.
Some don’t do that and sit on the money or spend it for other reasons.
Quotation 2: But then you turn around and look at 63% of people in drug
court [are white]. And nobody could explain that. And I think that when
you when you start looking at drug court and finding out all the fees, some
of them were mandatory. They’ve made a way put a waiver in giving the
judge authority to waive fees. There were people that if you had the
money to pay for your assessment, you pay to get in. If you need to and
can pay for treatment, and then you could get in drug court. And if you
couldn’t do that, then you couldn’t get in drug court. So it wasn’t a thing
that drug court administrators were saying, you know, we don’t like black
people. We’re not going to let you in. It was all the system was built up in
a way that it was just going to be impossible for most of the black
defendants to get in.
Quotation 3: If I’m putting you in a drug court, are you going get the
treatment you need? Well, yeah, but you’re going to have to pay for that.
And can you pay for that? It’s a pay to play type situation in
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Mississippi…Some of the drug courts, you know, if you don't have the
money to get in, you’re not getting in. Period.
The initial code pricing people out was one of the building blocks for the focused
code by the same name, pricing people out. Like the initial code, the focused code of
pricing people out reflected the idea that some persons are priced-out of participating in
reform programs because they cannot afford the fees. This focused code was one of the
building blocks for the Theory of Failure to Make Programs Affordable, which is the
theory is that reform will not be fully implemented if potential participants cannot enroll
in programs because of cost-prohibitive fees. The through-line for this process would
look as follows: initial code - pricing people out → focused code - pricing people out →
Theory of Failure to Make Programs Affordable.
The initial code missing targets is defined as applying a program to the wrong
people. Three example quotations for the initial code are as follows:
Quotation 1: Court and the focus of drug court has never been to get
people clean and sober. The focus of drug court has always been to reduce
recidivism and prevent crime. That’s why we have it. We don’t have it to
monitor these people for 5, 6, 7 years to make sure they’re not relapsing.
Because you can certainly relapse in alcohol or drugs and not return to
criminal behavior.
Quotation 2: Well, the drug court is, the way it was originally designed,
and the way that I think it’s trying to be pushed by the Administrative
Office of Courts, is that it is an alternative sentencing. And it’s a court of
last resort. What I mean by that is if I get charged with possession of
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cocaine, or possession of meth, or even possession of marijuana – because
we still we still charge people with felony possession of marijuana – those
people if they’re a first-time offender, they’re not supposed to be in drug
court, unless they have some type of record or pattern where they need to
be in drug court. And so if you look at that, why is that? Well, some
people would say they need to be in drug court because they have a drug
problem. Well, if you put them in drug court, drug courts are more
expensive than traditional probation. It’s more expensive than some types
of unsupervised probation, or even a misdemeanor type plea deal. And
you’re wasting resources. So you’re adding costs to the criminal justice
system. And you have someone that normally wouldn’t be in drug court is
now using these resources for people that we are trying to redirect from
prison into drug court. Not put extra people into drug court that wouldn’t
be in prison in the first place.
Quotation 3: Well, there were problems in the old days with some of the
ones that were tested out. And it was because sometimes the drug court
was the only diversion program available to a judge. And it was suggested
to me several times that let’s say you might have some kid who was
maybe from a prominent family, who was picked up on drug charges, and
the judge might say, “Oh, well, we got to put him in the drug court.” Was
he appropriate for the drug court? Or not? Maybe or maybe not. But it’s
the only diversion program they’ve got. So sometimes there were some
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questions about whether or not the people who were being put in the drug
court were the best people to put there.
The initial code missing targets was one of the building blocks for the focused
code missing targets (people, programs, and places). This focused code reflected in part
the idea that programs can be directed towards the wrong populations, and it was one of
the building blocks for the Theory of Failure to Hit Targets. The theory is that programs
directed to the wrong populations result in targets being missed and this serves as an
obstacle to implementation The through-line for this process would look as follows:
initial code – missing targets → focused code - missing targets (people, programs, and
places) → Theory of Failure to Hit Targets.
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